DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 088 166 80 EA 005 898

AUTHOR	Brown, Dudley E.; Hines, Edward R.
TITLE	State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Wisconsin.
INSTITUTION	Ohio State Univ., Columbus. Educational Governance Project.
SPONS AGENCY	Office of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE	Feb 74
NOTE	103p.; Related documents are EA 005 798-799, EA 005 833-834, EA 005 875-876, and EA 005 899
EDRS PRICE	MF-$0.75 HC-$5.40
DESCRIPTORS	Anti Segregation Programs; Decision Making; Educational Assessment; Educational Finance; *Educational Policy; Elementary Schools; Evaluation; *Financial Policy; Governance; *Policy Formation; Political Influences; Public Schools; Racial Integration; Secondary Schools; *State Departments of Education; State Government; *Statewide Planning; Teacher Certification
IDENTIFIERS	Elementary Secondary Education Act Title V; ESEA Title V; Statewide Assessment; *Wisconsin

ABSTRACT

This report examines Wisconsin's demographic, social, economic, and political characteristics; and focuses in particular on the structural features of education and government at the State level to provide additional understanding of the context of the State policymaking system. Discussed are four issue areas that illustrate the State policy process for public education: school finance, desegregation, teacher certification, and an area of educational program improvement -- the Statewide assessment program of the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction. An analysis of the policy roles and relationships is made that draws on background and structural material as well as on the treatment of the issue areas. Generalizations and interpretative statements are then derived from this descriptive material. Finally, some predictive statements are made about emergent policy roles and relationships for State educational governance in Wisconsin. (Author)

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STATE POLICY MAKING FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF WISCONSIN

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EA 005 898

This report is one of twelve case studies growing out of the Educational Governance Project. In addition, two major reports, a comparative analysis across states and an explication of alternative models of state governance of education, are in preparation. The Governance Project began in January, 1972 and is to be completed in August, 1974. The work was funded by the U. S. Office of Education under Title V (Section 505) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (OEG-0-73-0499). The Policy Board for the Project was composed of three chief state school officers: Martin W. Essex of Ohio, Jack P. Nix of Georgia, and Ewald B. Nyquist of New York, with the State of Ohio serving as fiscal agent. An Advisory Committee composed of eleven persons concerned with general and educational governance also served the project. Contract for the work was let to the College of Education, The Ohio State University and Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr. were the directors.

The activity which is the subject of this report was supported in whole or in part by the U. S. Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. However, the opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the U. S. Office of Education, and no official endorsement by the U. S. Office of Education should be inferred.

February, 1974

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

Section I - The Context for the State Educational Policy System in Wisconsin 1

Demography 2
Social Characteristics 3
Economic Characteristics 6
Political Characteristics 9

Section II - The Formal Structure for State Education Policy Making 15

The Governor 16
The State Legislature 19
The Chief State School Officer 25
The Department of Public Instruction 27

Section III - Selected State Educational Policy Issue Areas 29

School Finance 29
Public School Desegregation 43
Certification 50
Educational Improvement Program 55

Section IV - Analysis of State Educational Policy Making 60

Educational Interest Groups 60
The Department of Public Instruction and the State Superintendent 69
The Legislature 77
The Governor 84

Section V - Projections 90

Footnotes 95

Appendix 99

INTRODUCTION

As one of twelve case studies of the governance of public elementary and secondary education at the state level, this case study deals with the State of Wisconsin. The setting for the state education policy system will be presented to include demographic, social, economic, and political characteristics. Structural features of education and government at the state level will be discussed to provide additional understanding of the context of the state policy-making system. Four issue areas were selected to illustrate the state policy process for public education; these issue areas were school finance, desegregation, teacher certification, and an area of educational program improvement--the statewide assessment program of the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction. An analysis of policy roles and relationships follows, which draws upon the background and structural material as well as the treatment of the issue areas. Generalizations and interpretative statements are then derived from this descriptive material. Finally, some predictive statements about emergent policy roles and relationships for state educational governance in Wisconsin are made.

SECTION I

THE CONTEXT FOR THE STATE EDUCATIONAL POLICY SYSTEM IN WISCONSIN

The purpose of this section is to provide a brief description of the contextual characteristics that help explain the state educational policy system in Wisconsin. To do this, some attention must be given to the basic demographic, social, economic, and political characteristics of the state.

The Badger State is located in America's heartland, still has many rural attractions--some would say disadvantages, and has few large urban centers. Yet Wisconsin has long been recognized for its progressive government and civil service reform. Recently, Wisconsin effected a merger of its two largest higher educational systems, and in the area of school finance state education and fiscal experts have worked to develop alternative methods for supporting public education. This forward-thinking character of Wisconsin is even reflected in the last stanzas of the State song:

> On, Wisconsin! Champion of the right. "Forward," our motto--God will give thee might!

Prior to statehood in 1848, Wisconsin was part of the vast Northwest Territory.[1] With frontage on Lakes Michigan and Superior on the east and north, and the Mississippi River on the west, the navigable rivers of Wisconsin offered natural waterways for travel to the west and to the south. A large American Indian population, and abundant animal and natural resources made the territory a target for the territorial expansion of both England and France. Even today one can observe remnants of the French influence in the names of cities such as Fond du Lac, Eau Claire, and LaCrosse. But the War of 1812 and its aftermath determined Wisconsin's future as a part of the development of the United States, rather than as a province of a European nation.

Demography

Having more than 8000 lakes, the face of Wisconsin was formed by the retreating glaciers of 10,000 years ago, a geographical event which resulted in distinctive landforms--Lake Superior Lowlands, Northern Highlands, Central Plains, Western Uplands, and Eastern Ridges and Lowlands.[2] Thirty years before statehood in 1848, the Wisconsin Territory had barely 3,000 people, a figure which increased one hundred fold by 1850. The 1970 Census showed that Wisconsin's 4,417,933 inhabitants enabled the state to rank sixteenth among the fifty states in population.[3] The per cent of change from 1960 to 1970 in population growth indicated that Wisconsin's population grew by nearly 12 per cent, placing the state twenty-second in population increase among all states and just below the United States average.

Within the state there is a distinct pattern of population distribution. Of Wisconsin's seventeen largest cities, fifteen are located in or near a triangular urban area in the southeastern region formed by (a) Milwaukee, Wisconsin's largest city located on Lake Michigan; (b) the area extending west to the state capitol at Madison; and (c) the region extending northeast to the Fox River Valley at the upper end of Lake Winnebago.[4] The 1970 Census showed that these fifteen cities contained 38 per cent of Wisconsin's total population. From 1960 to 1970, fifteen of the twenty-five counties having population growth in excess of 10.5 per cent were located in the southeastern population triangle.

The remainder of the state, in the northern and western regions, is an extensive tract of largely rural land of farms, woods, and lakes. Nearly half of Wisconsin's 36 million acres is devoted to woodlots, pastures, and croplands.[5] Forests constitute nearly 40 per cent of the state's land, and

barely two per cent is made up of incorporated urban municipalities. Most of the urban two per cent is within the southeastern region, although a considerable amount of southeastern farm land is among the state's most productive agricultural areas.

When Wisconsin gained statehood, its largest city had over 20,000 residents. Milwaukee, with nearly three-quarters of a million people, is by far Wisconsin's largest city. In the early days, Lutherans from Northern Germany, who were seeking religious freedom from persecution, came to Wisconsin and settled in Milwaukee[6] which soon became famous as a German-oriented metropolis. Its craftsmen, intellectuals, and social reformers go far beyond popular legacy of Frederick Pabst, Joseph Schlitz, and Val Blatz. Like other urban centers, however, Milwaukee has not been immune from civil and racial disturbances as attested to by 1967 urban riots. The population growth figures from 1960 to 1970 reveal that the four counties immediately around Milwaukee had a total population increase of 147 per cent, compared with the city's population increase of under two per cent.[7] These statistics reflect the out-migration patterns of people moving into the suburbs.

The results of this disproportionate suburban growth, as contrasted with urban growth, have important implications for education in the cities, as later discussion of desegregation will show. Moreover, the Milwaukee Schools are treated virtually as a separate entity at the state level because of the size of the district. A separate statute governs the Milwaukee School system (Chapter 119 of the statutes of Wisconsin) and the Milwaukee School Board employs its own legislative representative in Madison in addition to the general representation provided by the Wisconsin Association of School Boards.

Social Characteristics

Additional background information on Wisconsin may be obtained by a consideration of the social characteristics of its population. One scholar

observed, by analysis of census data from 1900 through 1960, that Wisconsin had an increasingly smaller portion of the nation's people, a figure which dropped to 2.2 per cent in 1960.[8] He predicted a continued but smaller growth somewhat below the national average. While the years since the Second World War have been marked by high birth rates in the nation, the birth rate in Wisconsin has been higher in the rural areas than in the urban centers. Yet, because of population shifts, the real growth is around the cities. Changes in birth and death rates have resulted in a bulge at either end of the age scale in Wisconsin. The 1970 Census showed that in percentage of total population aged 21 to 64, Wisconsin at 48 per cent was ranked fortieth behind the United States average at 50.5 per cent.[9] In Wisconsin, therefore, those in the 21 to 64 age group must bear the burden of supporting the old and the young.

Ethnicity and heritage have played a significant role in the development of the State of Wisconsin. Table 1 shows that Wisconsin has a lower percentage than the national average of people with native-born parents. One finds, therefore, that proportionately more people in Wisconsin have parents of foreign or mixed heritage.

TABLE 1

NATIVE AND FOREIGN STOCK POPULATION, U.S. AND WISCONSIN (IN PERCENTAGES)

	Native Parentage	Foreign or Mixed Parentage
United States	83.5	11.8
Wisconsin	83.1	14.0

SOURCE: 1970 Census of Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics, United States Summary, June 1972, Table 143.

The German influence, especially in Milwaukee, has been mentioned. Other national groups are well represented in the Badger State. Table 2 indicates that of Wisconsin's population with foreign heritage, Germany,

Poland, the Scandinavian countries, Canada, and the United Kingdom are well represented. Cornish miners, Norwegian farmers, German communitarians, Danish and Dutch dairymen, and Polish laborers all contribute to the rich, cultural heritage of Wisconsin.

TABLE 2

SELECTED COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN OF THE WISCONSIN POPULATION WITH FOREIGN OR MIXED PARENTAGE, 1970

Country	Per Cent of Population with Foreign or Mixed Heritage by Country
Germany	33.1
Poland	9.9
Norway	7.8
Canada	5.0
United Kingdom	3.6
Sweden	3.9
Italy	3.9
Denmark	2.7

SOURCE: 1970 Census of Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics, United States Summary, June 1972, Table 144.

Of Wisconsin's racial minorities, as indicated by Table 3, the largest groups are blacks and Native Americans (i.e., Indians). Overwhelmingly, blacks tend to reside in urban areas (see Table 4). This factor has presented special concerns for Wisconsin's educators because of the concentration of blacks in cities and even within selected areas within cities. The Native Americans tend to be located on or near reservations in the more rural areas of the state, but there is a substantial population in Milwaukee.

TABLE 3

RACIAL MINORITIES IN WISCONSIN, 1950, 1960, AND 1970 (IN PERCENTAGES)

	Total Nonwhite	Black	Native American	Oriental
1950	1.2	67.3	29.1	2.7
1960	2.4	79.4	15.2	3.0
1970	3.6	80.6	11.9	4.1

SOURCE: The State of Wisconsin Blue Book, 1971, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, 1971, p. 206.

TABLE 4

BLACKS BY PER CENT URBAN AND RURAL RESIDENCE IN WISCONSIN, 1970

	Total Urban	Total Rural Nonfarm	Total Rural	Black Urban	Black Rural Nonfarm	Black Rural
United States	73.5	21.3	5.2	81.3	15.7	3.0
Wisconsin	65.9	23.2	10.9	98.5	1.4	.1

SOURCE: 1970 Census of Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics, United States Summary, June 1972, Table 142.

Recent census figures showed that of Wisconsin's 36 largest cities, only eight had nonwhite populations of one per cent or more.[10] Of these eight cities, observers pointed out that in Milwaukee, Racine, Kenosha, and Beloit there have been concerns about interracial tensions in recent years. Menominee and Shawano Counties both have large populations of Native Americans, and state educators have worked extensively with these communities on these concerns in recent years.

While Wisconsin has not been forced to deal with widespread racial tensions as have some other states, the concentration of disadvantaged minority groups in urban ghettos and explicit actions by Native Americans have presented unique educational challenges to state officials. This discussion will be continued later as part of the analysis of school desegregation.

Economic Characteristics

Wisconsin's economic characteristics present a multi-faceted picture. In reflecting upon Wisconsin's rank in manufacturing employment (ranked 11th among the states in 1968), in value added by manufacture (ranked 11th in 1967), and in value of industrial exports (ranked 9th in 1966), one writer noted that as an industrial state, Wisconsin was doing well relative to land

area and population.[11] The states economically ahead of Wisconsin were all larger in population. With its diversified industrial, agricultural, and recreational base, Wisconsin's economic future appears sound.

Although Wisconsin ranked fifteenth among all states in total personal income in 1970, the state on a per capita basis does not present an affluent picture, even though the 1970 median personal income of $10,068 was greater than the United States average at $9,590.[12] In per capita personal income, Wisconsin was ranked 24th among the states in 1970, its figure being nearly $300 per capita less than the United States average of $3,921. In percentage increase in per capita personal income from 1960 to 1970, Wisconsin ranked 38th at 69.9 as against the United States average of 76.9. In personal income per child of school age, a common measure of a state's economic ability to fiscally support schools, Wisconsin ranked 24th with $14,144, somewhat lower than the United States average of $15,063.

Much of the reason for Wisconsin ranking somewhat below the United States average on a per capita basis may be seen by the fact that in households with cash incomes under $3000 in 1970, Wisconsin ranked 16th with 15.1 per cent which placed Wisconsin and several other states near the United States average. A considerable number of the state's citizens, moreover, are engaged in blue collar trades and in lower paying occupations, as seen in Tables 5 and 6.

TABLE 5

EMPLOYED PERSONS BY SELECTED INDUSTRIES, 1970 (IN PERCENTAGES)

	Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries	Manufacturing	Wholesale and Retail Trade	Public Administration
United States	3.7	25.9	20.1	5.5
Wisconsin	6.5	31.0	19.9	3.8

SOURCE: 1970 Census of Population, United States Summary, June 1972.

EMPLOYED PERSONS BY BROAD OCCUPATIONAL GROUP, 1970 (IN PERCENTAGES)

	White Collar Workers	Blue Collar Workers	Farm Workers	Service Workers
United States	58.2	35.9	3.1	12.8
Wisconsin	43.3	37.3	6.1	13.4

SOURCE: 1970 Census of Population, United States Summary, June 1972.

Farm income in total cash receipts as of 1970, ranked the Badger State 8th. The difficulty in the farming industry in recent years is shown by the fact that even a high ranking on this dimension does not really affect the state's overall economy. Farming tends to employ progressively fewer people as the small family farmers are forced out of business. Dairy farming has been a stronghold of Wisconsin's farm economy, but the number of dairy farms, since 1959, has declined as a percentage of all farms.

In 1967, Udell cited several factors why Wisconsin's economy in personal income growth was not keeping pace with the United States average.[13] Durable-goods manufacturers were decentralizing geographically by building facilities closer to markets and away from traditional industrial states. The postwar aerospace and technical industries tended to be located outside the traditional industrial regions of the nation. Federal defense expenditures tended to follow the technologically-oriented industries and, thus, away from states like Wisconsin. Industries seeking new locations would not be immediately attracted to the rigorous climate of Wisconsin even though its terrain might provide attractive living conditions.

To leave a person with negative connotations about Wisconsin's slower economic growth and lower fiscal ability as predictors of educational support would be premature for Wisconsin presents a very different picture on the dimension of effort. In per capita total general expenditures for all functions of government in 1970, the Badger State ranked 15th with $435,

considerably ahead of the United States average of $384. On this dimension Wisconsin outranked all four other states in the East North Central region of Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. In the area of education, Wisconsin was ranked 12th in public school revenue receipts per pupil in average daily attendance, 1971-1972. In local and state revenue receipts for public schools as a per cent of personal income in 1970, Wisconsin was ranked 10th.

Wisconsin's fiscal difficulties are not dissimilar from those experienced by other states that have engaged in agriculturally-related occupations. Yet, when it comes to the effort expended to support state government, including education, the performance of the Badger State has been impressive. This effort by state government to deliver services will be discussed later.

Political Characteristics

In reviewing dimensions of political culture, some attention will be given initially to what other writers have said about Wisconsin. In an analysis of voter turnout in selected Presidential elections during the period 1920 through 1968, Milbrath showed that Wisconsin voters consistently went to the polls in greater relative numbers than the national average.[14] Even in non-Presidential years, Wisconsin citizens turned out with a frequency greater than more than half the other states for gubernatorial and senatorial contests.

Another means of viewing state governments was provided by Walker, who examined the performance of state governments with regard to innovation.[15] Innovation was defined as the relative speed with which a state government adopted a new program or policy. Eighty-eight programs enacted prior to 1965 were analyzed including nine in the area of education. On a composite innovation score, Wisconsin ranked 10th and ahead of states like Ohio, Minnesota, Illinois, Indiana, and Florida.

Political scientists have theorized that states having the greatest inter-party competition are most likely to be the most effective and responsible in state government. Ranney demonstrated that Wisconsin is best classified as two-party state rather than one-party or modified one-party in inter-party competition.[16] Wisconsin's ranking as a two-party state is therefore congruent with its assessment as a politically active state as measured by voter turnout. In this type of environment, one could conjecture that state government might be more innovative, and the high ranking on the innovation dimension is corroborative.

A final dimension of political culture to be considered was provided by Elazar who viewed the states according to dominant political culture.[17] Elazar's typology included the individualistic political culture where government tended to be viewed as a marketplace, moralistic where government tended to be viewed as a commonwealth, and traditionalistic where government tended to be viewed as a means of maintaining the existing order. Wisconsin clearly was classified as moralistic with some individualistic modification in the southeastern urban triangle. In viewing government as a commonwealth enterprise, politics is considered to be healthy because it is every citizen's responsibility. Parties tend to serve as mechanisms to attain goals in the public interest. Political party cohesiveness is subordinate to principles and political party competition tends to be over issues. In the moralistic political culture, third parties can emerge especially if the public interest is served.

A cursory review of Wisconsin history will demonstrate the forward-looking nature of its state government and the continuing spirit to get its citizens involved in the governmental process. This outlook has enabled the state to give the nation several "firsts," including the concept of the kindergarten, development of the typewriter, and a radio broadcasting station.

Not only have Wisconsin citizens gone on to become leaders in the federal government but eminent citizens have also given leadership to other fields including Frank Lloyd Wright in architecture and Douglas MacArthur in the military. The visibility of Wisconsin's governmental ideals has been most evident in its Progressivism, first articulated by "Fighting Bob" LaFollette and continued as the "Wisconsin Idea" which some observers claim served as a conceptual basis for later movements in the federal government such as the New Deal Era of the 1930s.[19]

As Wisconsin's first native-born Governor, Robert M. LaFollette emerged in a period ripe for governmental reform. As the 19th Century drew to a close, the Industrial Revolution had spawned a host of special private business interests and seemingly privileged individuals who were gaining control of Wisconsin's political institutions. As a student at the University of Wisconsin, Robert LaFollette heard a commencement speaker observe that "for the first time in our politics money is taking the field as an organized power."[20] LaFollette well knew the Midwestern heritage of agrarian protest, and in moral terms he contrasted the striving monopolists and the toiling farmers. After his gubernatorial election in 1901, he was determined to redeem the "good state of Wisconsin from the rule of a handful of men who had destroyed every vestige of democracy in the commonwealth."[21]

It was difficult to be neutral about LaFollette and Progressivism. A group of anti-LaFollette Republicans called "stalwarts" emerged in the state legislature but over time these men were no match for the widespread appeal of Progressivism. By the time of his election to the U.S. Senate in 1904, LaFollette's subordinates were well trained to continue Progressivism in the state. Wisconsin became an experiment in progressive government while LaFollette spearheaded progressive ideas at the federal level to include direct election of senators, railroad regulation, and reform of working

conditions. While LaFollette's Progressive ideology suffered from his opposition to U.S. involvement in the first World War, the Progressive ethic brought a new era of citizen participation into state government. While Progressives were busy reforming state government, another third party emerged in Milwaukee. The Social Democratic political party, under the leadership of Victor Berger, pressed for programs of municipal reform.[22]

The Progressive legacy of Robert LaFollette was continued on two fronts by his sons, Philip, who became governor,and Bob Jr., who as a U. S. Senator at thirty, was the youngest senator since Henry Clay. Somehow the Progressive ideology, with its call for citizen involvement and simple values, was unable to sustain support as America became more complex and committed to world pursuits. Following the failure of the National Progressives of America, an attempt at a national Progressive movement by Phil LaFollette, and Bob LaFollette's defeat in the 1946 primaries to an ex-marine and Circuit Judge named Joseph R. McCarthy, the Progressive era in Wisconsin was brought to an end.[23] The older Progressive leaders, at Bob LaFollette's encouragement, rejoined the Republican Party while the younger Progressives were attracted to the regenerated Democratic Party which had suffered from years of weakness and reactionary leaders.

One writer, in describing the political choices made after World War II in Wisconsin, stated:

> In retrospect, the voters in Wisconsin's Republican primary in 1946 may have made the worst choice ever made in any free election anywhere. They ended the LaFollette era in Wisconsin politics and simultaneously unleashed one of the most cruel demagogues that the United States has ever known.[24]

Ironically, many of the German-Americans who had supported Progressivism were attracted to McCarthy's economic conservatism and anti-communism. McCarthy's single-minded crusade against Communists in the United States

government made him one of America's most controversial figures. Although the name McCarthy automatically brought Wisconsin to many people's minds, his concerns were much more on the national than state level. After censure by the U.S. Senate in 1954, McCarthy's visibility waned, and he died in 1957.

The period following World War II and the demise of the Progressives also marked the emergence of two-party politics in Wisconsin. While the Progressives as a formalized political party no longer existed, their spirit was continued by many Wisconsin officials who advocated citizen participation and clean government. A special election was held to fill McCarthy's seat and what came as a surprise to many people was the success of Democrat William Proxmire. The new Democratic organization was able to weld together most of the disparate elements that had supported the Progressives, the Socialists, and the once-hapless Democrats of the state. Principal architects of this new era included Gaylord Nelson (now U.S. Senator and who was Governor from 1958-1962); Proxmire himself; John Reynolds (Governor, 1962-1964); and the present Governor, Patrick J. Lucey.[25]

The Democratic Party in Wisconsin at present receives much of its strength from a diverse base of support: labor unions in Milwaukee, Madison (the base of operation for the Progressives), the Irish Catholics of Green Bay, the blue-collar workers of Racine and Kenosha, the Scandinavians of the northern rural counties, and the men who work the paper mills in the northern part of the state. Despite the present Democratic strength in the Governor and two U.S. Senators, Wisconsin has had Democratic control of either legislative chamber at the state level only twice in twenty-six opportunities and Democratic governors in only four of twelve terms between 1948 and 1968. In more recent years, Democrats controlled the Assembly in 1971 and they were also in the majority in the 1973 Assembly. But since World War II the Democrats have never controlled the Senate.

Drawing upon an economically conservative rural base in the Badger State, the Republican Party established a firm hold over much of state government. It is only in recent years that Democrats have risen to a position approaching that of a political co-equal with Republicans.

In summary, the context for the state educational policy system in Wisconsin includes demographic, social, economic, and political characteristics. In its demography, Wisconsin is divided between the urban southeastern region and the remainder of the state. While its suburban population grows rapidly, the total population increase of the state and its per capita personal income are below the United States averages. The social composition of its people and their moralistic political culture draw upon an ethnically diverse heritage. Wisconsin's major strength springs out of the ethics and industry of its citizens. In its fiscal support of the services of state government, including education, and in innovative state programs, Wisconsin presents an impressive forward-looking picture. In the analysis of selected policy issue areas and relationships in Wisconsin, this background information will permit a deeper understanding of the State. As further background, the structure for state education policy making will be outlined to broaden our view of the nature of the policy process, a subject to which we now turn.

SECTION II

THE FORMAL STRUCTURE FOR STATE EDUCATION POLICY MAKING

Structural characteristics of state government in Wisconsin will include four areas of concern: the Governor, the state legislature, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Department of Public Instruction. Compared with other states, a unique feature of Wisconsin's state government for education is the absence of a state board of education. At first glance, the exclusion of this state-level body as a mechanism for citizen involvement appears inconsistent with the progressive nature of state government in Wisconsin. On closer examination, however, one can see that public education, the largest governmental enterprise in the state, is under the supervision of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, an elected official witnin the Executive Branch of state government. The State Superintendent, a constitutional officer, is elected every four years on a nonpartisan ballot.[26] The instruments for providing education are the local school districts which are answerable to locally elected school boards. With the exception of a State Board of Vocational, Technical and Adult Education which was created by the legislature in 1911 to fill educational needs not being met within regular school districts, Wisconsin state government has chosen to place the thrust of its educational apparatus directly at the local level.[27] In this context, a state board of education may have been seen as an unnecessary middle echelon between the voters and the State Superintendent. The absence of a state board of education, thus, becomes supportive of local control of and citizen participation in local school governance. While there have been recent attempts to provide a state board of education, Wisconsin has been notable for the absence of this state governing body.

The Governor

As chief executive, the Governor heads the Executive Branch of state government. The executive branch carries out the programs and policies determined by the legislative branch, and the judicial branch is responsible for the adjudication of any conflicts which might arise from the interpretation or application of the laws. The Wisconsin Constitution vested the executive power in the Governor and as such he holds the ultimate responsibility for state administration. This responsibility grew in scope until the Governor at one time had eighty-five state agencies under his jurisdiction. In a major reorganization in 1967, the legislature reduced this number from 85 to 32 state agencies, including four constitutional offices, 14 administrative departments, and 14 independent agencies.[28] In Wisconsin there are six constitutional officers who are elected by the voters. They include the heads of the six constitutional offices--namely, the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, Attorney General, and State Superintendent of Public Instruction. As of 1970, the terms of office for all constitutional officers were four years. Some of the other heads of administrative departments are nominated by the Governor but appointed on the advice and consent of the Senate. The independent agencies have quasi-judicial functions or are concerned with the institutions of higher education. All heads of agencies except the head of the State Historical Society are appointed by the Governor with the consent of the Senate.

One of the outstanding characteristics of Wisconsin state government has been its merit system in civil service. Adopted in 1905, the classification and promotion on the basis of merit, rather than on patronage or longevity, is another idea born of the Progressive Era in state government.

Civil servants are categorized as classified or unclassified employees. The classified service comprises the overwhelming majority of state employees. Appointments and promotions are based on merit (i.e., by competitive examination). The unclassified service includes all officers elected by the people and all officers and employees appointed by the Governor, and by other agency heads where the legislature has expressly provided for a Table of Organization of Unclassified positions. Whatever the merits of the civil service system, it does serve to limit the power of the constitutional officers. The State Superintendent of Public Instruction, for instance, is constrained by civil service regulations in appointing people to serve on the staff of the Department of Public Instruction.

Until as recently as 1969 a Governor's term of office in Wisconsin was only two years. The last Governor to have served a two year term was Warren Knowles who served a total of three two-year terms. In 1970 the term of office was extended to four years. Patrick J. Lucey, born and raised in the rural western Wisconsin, returned to his native state to manage farms after serving in the Second World War. After serving as an Assemblyman and later as the state chairman of the Democratic Party, he was elected Lieutenant Governor in 1964. Following interim years of Republican Governorships, Lucey came back to win the gubernatorial election in 1970. He is Wisconsin's first Governor who will have served a full four-year term.

One of the means by which a governor's strength can be assessed is an evaluation of his formal powers. Schlesinger devised an index of the formal powers of governors on which Wisconsin, and five other states, received 15 points on a 20-point scale.[29] Twenty-four other states received rankings above 15, so one might conclude that in measurement of formal powers Wisconsin seemed to be assessed as average. This index, however, was comprised of several categories including tenure potential, budgetary control,

the power of appointment, and veto power. In the area of tenure potential, Wisconsin's Governor was ranked in the highest of five categories where the Governor had no restraint on his own re-election and terms were four years in length. In the area of budgetary control, Wisconsin's Governor was evaluated in the highest of five categories because in the State the Governor retains full responsibility for budget preparation, sharing this authority only with individuals directed by him. Thus, the Wisconsin Governor has considerable formal power because he may succeed himself and retains a high degree of control over the Executive Budget. In power of appointment Wisconsin's Governor was ranked in the next to lowest of the five categories because, of the sixteen major state officers analyzed by Schlesinger, legislative approval was needed, as previously mentioned, for many of these appointments. Finally, in veto power Wisconsin was ranked as "medium," that is, midway in the five categories because more than a majority of legislative members present is needed to override a veto by the Governor. In areas such as appointment and veto powers, the Wisconsin legislature emerges as having considerable control over the Chief Executive.

In the executive branches of some state governments, governors employ major staff officers to deal with educational matters among other public policy concerns. On occasion, other governors employ junior staff personnel, sometimes within program staffs, whose responsibilities include the area of education. In the State of Wisconsin there are no officials working in the Executive Office who have direct responsibilities in education. But this does not mean that interest in education affairs is lacking. The Governor's Secretary of Administration, reported to be one of his three "first-tier" advisers, exercises continuing interest in educational affairs, primarily through the use of full-time education budget analysts in the Office of Planning and Budget. Additionally, the Governor's Executive Assistant,

formerly a faculty member in a Wisconsin higher educational institution, has general interest in the educational affairs of state government. Finally, the Executive Secretary to the Lieutenant Governor was formerly the education budget analyst in the Department of Administration as well as an employee in state aid administration of the Department of Public Instruction. Thus, while the Governor does not maintain daily contact with education, he retains a generalized interest in educational activities through his fiscal staff who monitor the financial affairs of the Department of Public Instruction.

The State Legislature

As regards the structure of the state legislature, the legislative branch of government consists of an upper house of 33 senators, a lower house of 99 representatives, the legislative staff employed by each house, and the legislative service agencies which the legislature has created. In the measurement of the Governor's formal powers, as previously discussed, it was in the areas of appointment and veto power that the Wisconsin legislature considerably modified the potential power of its Governor. Wisconsin legislators are well paid in comparison with other states. In biennial compensation, Wisconsin in 1970 outranked all but nine other states.[30]

When the legislature is in session the usual schedule is to meet Tuesdays through Thursdays of each week. Toward the end of most floor periods the houses meet almost continuously Monday through Friday with some evening sessions. In terms of length of session, it is not uncommon for the Wisconsin legislature to remain in session well over 300 calendar days of the year. In 1971 over 3000 pices of legislation and resolutions were introduced and of this number only three bills were vetoed by the Governor.[31]

It is useful to examine what other writers have said about the Wisconsin legislature particularly in its relation to other states. Based on early and mid-1960s data, Grumm assessed factors of legislative input and policy output.[32] On the input side, Wisconsin was rated high on the dimension of economic affluence, measured by such variables as retail sales per capita, median school years completed, and increase in the percentage of black population. While per capita income was one variable of economic affluence, it will be remembered that Wisconsin is not a highly affluent state on that variable alone. On the dimension of population expansion, the Badger State was not ranked high, and this conclusion is consistent with data presented earlier in this report. Regarding policy output, Grumm ranked Wisconsin high on the dimensions of welfare liberalism and financial centralization. Welfare liberalism included the variables of average teachers' salaries and public school expenditures per capita. Financial centralization included the variables of state taxes per $1000 in personal income and per cent of local school revenues from the state. Grumm also constructed a professionalism index composed of such factors as legislators' compensation, length of session, and expenditures for legislative services. On legislative professionalism, Wisconsin outranked all but eight other states.[33]

Based on more recent data, the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures assessed the performance and effectiveness of the state legislatures according to dimensions of functionality, accountability, informedness, independence, and representativeness.[34] The overall rank of Wisconsin was fifth behind only California, New York, Illinois, and Florida. The individual rankings for Wisconsin compared with other states were as follows:

Functionality.....7	Independence.....4
Accountability.....21	Representativeness.....10
Informedness.....3	

The Wisconsin legislature, in the opinion of the Citizens Conference staff, was rated high on informedness and independence. Informedness referred to adequate time for sessions, the information processing capabilities of standing committees, between-session activities, bill form, staff resources, and capacity for fiscal review. Independence included legislative autonomy regarding procedures, independence from the executive branch, and capacity for effective oversight of executive operations.

One could conclude, then, that the state legislature in Wisconsin is an informed, relatively autonomous body comprised of comparatively well-paid legislators who do not hesitate to devote most of the calendar year to completing a session. There are other important aspects to the Wisconsin legislative process, and they include the biennial nature of the legislative sessions, the fiscal review process, and the staffing patterns of the legislature.

Every two years at the November general elections, the entire membership of the Assembly is elected and about one-half of the membership of the Senate is elected.[35] The official legislative session begins on the first Monday in January of each odd-numbered year. Employing the system of program budgeting, the budget is prepared and enacted biennially. Thus, major legislative actions dealing with fiscal implications tend to fall on a biennial basis in relationship to this biennial budgetary process although there are provisions for an annual budget review. In 1953, Wisconsin pioneered a process now widely used in other states whereby fiscal notes are attached to all pieces of legislation with financial ramifications which cite in detail the immediate and long-range fiscal effects of the legislation. While the fiscal notes are often prepared by the implementing agency, the Department of Administration is directly involved in the fiscal review of all the agencies' biennial budgets. Any fiscal legislation with fiscal notes

be referred before enactment to the powerful Joint Committee on Finance. As a consequence, this joint legislative fiscal committee and its staff hold a key position in the legislative structure.

Assisting the Joint Committee on Finance is the Legislative Fiscal Bureau, a major organization for legislative support services. Staffed by ten employees and a Director, the work of the Legislative Fiscal Bureau is under the administrative supervision of the Joint Committee on Legislative Organization. In general, the Legislative Fiscal Bureau has been directed to carry out fiscal and program analysis, review and evaluate requests for appropriations, analyze agency operating budgetary requests, answer fiscal information requests for individual legislators, evaluate legislative proposals for fiscal effect, make indepth studies of statewide policy, and provide fiscal informational services for other legislative staff. The Bureau includes one staff member who analyzes the budget proposal of the Department of Public Instruction (DPI) and at the request of the Joint Finance Committee makes recommendations concerning the budget of the DPI. It should be noted that this fiscal analysis is very important to the legislative budget and policy-making process in education.

In addition to the Legislative Fiscal Bureau, another vital staff committee includes the seventeen employees and Executive Secretary working for the Joint Legislative Council, an organization of nineteen legislators established in 1947 to direct the activities of many of the interim study committees of the legislature. The Joint Legislative Council, and specifically its permanent eighteen-member staff, conducts indepth research studies including those in education, but it also introduces pieces of legislation directly to legislature during the official sessions. The Council staff coordinates many of its efforts with the Legislative Fiscal Bureau in comprehensively analyzing legislation both for policy and fiscal implications.

One of the most important activities of the Council is that of providing the professional legal/research staff to the substantive standing committees (except the Joint Committee on Finance) during legislative sessions. The Council employs an attorney whose responsibilities include education. The Executive Secretary is an experienced, knowledgeable, and respected observer of state government and legislative matters.

Besides supervising the work of the Legislative Fiscal Bureau, the Joint Committee on Legislative Organization supervises the activities of four bureaus, including the Legislative Reference Bureau which drafts legislation and publishes the annual State of Wisconsin Blue Book. The committee structure of the state legislature is at the heart of legislative activities, and is a subject to which we now turn.

To a great extent, the work in each legislative chamber is carried on by committees, particularly the standing committees of which there are 11 in the Senate and 20 in the Assembly. Standing committees, composed only of legislators, are operative primarily during the legislative session while procedural committees, three in the Senate and six in the Assembly, are composed of legislators and others in state government and may function during interim sessions. Of special interest in this discussion are those committees in education and finance.

The Committees on Finance in both houses constitute the Joint Committee on Finance. This Joint Finance Committee seems to wield much power and to stand head and shoulders above other committees, since any bill with financial import must have its recommendation. In our interviews, almost without exception respondents replying to the question, "What committees are the decisive ones when it comes to major bills affecting the public schools?" mentioned the Joint Finance Committee. Comments such as "it is the key body" and "definitely the most powerful" were frequent. The Governor was reported to work very closely with this committee in developing his budget.

An important feature of the Assembly is that the Speaker has the responsibility of appointing all the committees, naming the chairmen of the committees, and assigning bills to committees. However, the present Speaker generally consults with the minority leader in the Senate, his political counterpart, before making the appointments. The Committee on Committees, the Senate appointing authority, decides who becomes chairman as well as who sits on what committee. Seniority is one criterion used to select chairmen although one former chairman said that not much emphasis was placed on seniority in Wisconsin but much thought was given to the legislator's field of expertise as well as his or her interests.

The Assembly Education Committee consists of 13 members including its chairman. There are nine Democrats and four Republicans on the Committee. To offset somewhat the power of the Joint Finance Committee, the Chairman of the Assembly Education Committee recently took the unprecedented step of initiating hearings on the budget bill. There are many educators and politicians who see this move as significant; others regard it as "cosmetic." What effect it will have on the total legislative process and more particularly on the powerful Joint Finance Committee remains to be seen.

The Health, Education, and Welfare Committee in the Senate, created in the 1973 session, was regarded by our respondents as less powerful than the Education Committee in the Assembly. Prior to the 1973 session there was a separate Education Committee in the Senate. The present Senate committee is composed of seven members, four of whom are Republicans and three Democrats.

Actual power in getting legislation passed, particularly if there is an attached fiscal note, resides in the Joint Finance Committee whose senatorial composition is five members, four of whom are Republicans and one Democrat. On the Assembly side there are nine members, seven of whom are

Democrats and two are Republicans. Taking the Joint Finance Committee as a whole, there are eight Democrats and six Republicans.

In Wisconsin there are several formal procedures associated with committee activities; these include public hearings and executive sessions. A public hearing of a committee is a vehicle to afford members of the public an opportunity to present their views, and it is felt that the impressions of citizens will greatly influence public attitude toward the legislature. Any proposal referred to a committee may, at the discretion of the Chairman, be scheduled for public hearing, but no hearings may be held until copies of the legislation scheduled are available to the public.

The Chief State School Officer

In Wisconsin the chief state school officer is constitutionally called the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Holding the office at the time of this research was Mr. William (Bill) C. Kahl whose term of office expired July 22, 1973, and who did not seek re-election. The Superintendent of Public Instruction is one of six constitutional officers of the state. The State Superintendent heads an administrative department within the Executive Branch, the Department of Public Instruction (DPI).

Article X, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution states that "The supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a state superintendent and such other officers as the legislature shall direct...The state superintendent shall be chosen by the qualified electors of the state...and shall hold his office for four years from the succeeding first Monday in July."[36] Since 1970, the term of office for all constitutional officers is four years, but the State Superintendent's tenure has been four years since 1902. In the true populist tradition the people of Wisconsin have felt the need for involvement in the selection of the people who serve the government constitutionally, and so the Superintendent is elected statewide on a non-partisan basis.

Under the laws of the State of Wisconsin, the State Superintendent's powers encompass several broad areas, including the following:

a. Appeals--examining and determining appeals, which by law are made to him.

b. Licensing and Certification of Teachers--making rules and prescribing standards of attainment for the examination, licensing, and certification of teachers within the limits of the law; revoking licenses.

c. Federal aids--accepting federal aid and being responsible for the disbursement of such funds.

The State Superintendent's general powers also includes the following:

a. The appointment of a deputy superintendent of public instruction, an executive assistant, and an unclassified secretary. These are the only three appointive positions given the Superintendent of Public Instruction.

b. Granting declarations of highschool graduation to persons qualified. He may also establish the standards by which high school equivalency is determined.

Along with these general powers, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction may (1) provide for the education of deaf-blind children, and (2) arrange for vocational, trade, or vocational training for any pupil qualified to take advantage of such schools. The Superintendent's policy-making authority is greater than what is contained in the law. He may issue regulations under the Administrative Code which have the force of law. He may also initiate legislation. In terms of implied powers, the State Superintendent supervises public education and nonsectarian instruction as well as inspecting schools, developing curriculum and instruction guides, administering aid programs, and supervising public libraries.

In describing the powers of the State Superintendent, one writer observed:

> By law (the State Superintendent) is vested with substantial powers to supervise and inspect the public schools, exclude sectarian instruction, operate special schools for the handicapped, prepare and publish courses of study, license and certify teachers, require reports from district schools, oversee school reorganization, and administer the school aids. Few other state-level officers have as broad and far-reaching powers. These powers have been exercized through a combination of professional guidance, leadership, exhortation, demonstration, and in exceptional cases compulsion.[37]

The Department of Public Instruction

In 1972 there were 472 full-time employees (excluding the residential schools) in the Department of Public Instruction (DPI). Total budget for the 1971-73 biennium was $794,060,300. For the most part, staff members of the Department of Public Instruction are civil servants. However, deputy executive assistants and one secretary are treated somewhat differently in that for them there are special classes of civil service based on the possession of special skills. An example of this is the Assistant Superintendent of Library Service. There are four Education Administrative Designations viz Classes I, II, III, IV, with Class IV being the highest rank.

In the area of research, evaluation, and planning, there were 15 professional persons engaged in this area for the 1972-73 year. In other divisions there were three people engaged in comprehensive educational planning and evaluation. The budget for this endeavor amounted to approximately $249,000--$208,000 of which went to the Department of Planning and Evaluation and $41,000 to other divisions. The number of professional persons employed in the Department of Research/Statistics was $5\frac{1}{2}$ (FTE) with a budget of $75,696.

The most outstanding strengths of the DPI were the ability to generate useful information for the legislature about the public schools, and the skillful legislative liaison provided by the Deputy Superintendent of Public

Instruction. In terms of expertise in the area of school aid, the Department had three officers who were all regarded by legislators interviewed as extremely knowledgeable. These officers were the former Superintendent, the former Deputy, and the Assistant Superintendent for school aid. The DPI must, therefore, be seen as a fountain of information concerning the public schools.

SECTION III

SELECTED STATE EDUCATIONAL POLICY ISSUE AREAS

Review of relevant background characteristics of Wisconsin provides a backdrop for examination of the process of state educational policy making. Four issue areas were selected as a means of illustrating this process, these issue areas being school finance, desegregation of schools, teacher certification, and the statewide assessment program of the Department of Public Instruction. While exhaustive examination of the four issues is beyond the scope of this study, a cross-sectional view as of the early 1970s is helpful in illuminating the state educational policy process.

School Finance

School finance studies, which are often technical considerations of foundation programs and methods by which revenues are allocated to local schools, can stand in isolation from larger public policy concerns. This treatment will provide a brief review of school finance in Wisconsin as it relates to raising and allocating revenues to public elementary and secondary schools. More important, school finance will be considered as a major issue area of public policy formulation and, as such, the dimensions of school finance will be related to the growing concerns in Wisconsin for the manner in which public schools are to be funded.

Citizen involvement in and progressive reform of state government have been two important themes in Wisconsin government. These themes were of importance in the late 1940s when, after a Commission on Improvement of the Educational System had investigated state aid to school districts, the Wisconsin legislature passed the following statute:

> It is declared to be the policy of this state that education is a state function and that SOME RELIEF SHOULD BE AFFORDED FROM THE LOCAL GENERAL PROPERTY TAX as a source of public school revenue

> where such tax is excessive, and that other sources of revenue should contribute a larger percentage of the total funds needed. It is further declared that in order to PROVIDE REASONABLE EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL THE CHILDREN OF THIS STATE, the state must guarantee that a basic educational opportunity be available to each pupil, but that the state should be obligated to contribute to the educational program only if the school district provides a program which meets state standards. It is the purpose of the state aid formula set forth in this subchapter to cause the state to assume a greater proportion of the costs of public education and to relieve the general property of some of its tax burden.[38] (Emphasis added.)

The forward-looking nature of this legislative action is reflected in the statute. It is particularly significant that even in 1949 the legislature foresaw that two goals were of special importance: property tax relief and providing equality of educational opportunity. In view of the similar actions in other states in the early 1970s, this statement, nearly twenty-five years old, of the Wisconsin legislature is noteworthy.

Adopting the commission's recommendations, the 1949 Wisconsin legislature enacted a basic formula for general state aid to school districts, based upon a guaranteed valuation per pupil, which has formed the basis for Wisconsin fiscal support of its schools ever since. Each biennium, the legislature determined the tax base necessary for support of one public school pupil for one school year. Every school district in the state was then guaranteed at least the minimum support of its schools for the year. This process is illustrated in Table 7, where the 1972-1973 guaranteed valuation was $52,000 per pupil membership. If the sample district had an equalized property valuation of $39,000, the district had 75 per cent of what the state guaranteed. This sample district, then, would have to raise 75 per cent of its net operating costs through property taxation. The remaining 25 per cent of its net operating costs would be provided by the state in general aid.

The state-established guaranteed valuation per membership, therefore, is an effort by the state to deal with the existing school district

TABLE 7

DETERMINATION OF STATE AID IN A SAMPLE DISTRICT

EQUALIZED VALUATION PER MEMBERSHIP	
Guaranteed valuation per pupil of $52,000 set by the legislature (1972-1973)	Sample district tax base of $39,000 equalized property valuation per membership, or 75 per cent of the guaranteed valuation
	State aid, supplementary to the local tax base, is the remaining 25 per cent or $13,000
NET OPERATING COST PER PUPIL	
Sample district determines its educational program at $1,000 per pupil (1972-1973)	Sample district pays 75 per cent or $750 of the $1,000 per membership expense
	Remaining 25 per cent, or $250 to come from general state aid

SOURCE: General State Aid to Local School Districts for 1973-1975. Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, Madison, 1972, p. 7.

differential in property valuations. In determining the amount of state aid to be received by any school district, however, one must also work with the concept of net operating costs. In school expenditures, operating costs are payments made during the school year for such items as salaries for staff, instructional supplies, maintenance and operation, transportation, food services, student activities, and other fixed charges. Operating costs, thus, are differentiated from costs for capital outlay and debt services. In Wisconsin operating costs for the state's local schools amounted to over 83 per cent of all school expenditures for the 1972-1973 school year.[39] Some of the operating costs are offset by operating receipts consisting of local, state, and federal monies of a largely categorical nature. By far the largest source of operating receipts is the local property tax, which in Wisconsin during the 1972-1973 school year amounted to nearly 62 per cent of

all school income.[40] Additionally, categorical state aids amounting to 10 per cent of schools' income for 1972-1973, include transportation aid in flat grants, handicapped aid, driver education aid, tuition payments, as well as other categories. Other sources of school income derive from school lunch receipts, interest from school lunch receipts, interest from investments, student fees, and proceeds from athletic events. There was a county aid of $30 per elementary teacher unit. Federal aid to local schools includes Title I funds, primarily, with some revenues also from Titles II and III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Net operating costs are those costs which must be shared between general state aid and local property tax. For the 1972-1973 year in Wisconsin general state aid amounted to nearly 21 per cent of the total state operating costs for schools.

State aid for public elementary and secondary schools in Wisconsin can be in the form of either flat grants or equalization aid.[41] In the example cited in Table 7, the state aid supplement would be equalized because the district tax base was less than the guaranteed tax base per membership for 1972-1973. If the district tax base had exceeded the guaranteed valuation per membership, then the district would have qualified for only a flat grant of less than $100 per pupil. The exact amount of the flat grant is determined by whether the school district is basic or integrated. Basic districts offer only a minimal educational program, while integrated districts offer more subjects in more program areas, as well as a wider array of services to pupils. In 1972-1973, 27 of Wisconsin's 436 school districts qualified only for flat grants.[42] Flat aids were eliminated in the 1973 legislative session.

Current Proglems in School Finance. The recent concerns in Wisconsin about the manner in which schools are funded deal with the inequality of

school district spending, the fact that the state supplement does not equalize among the districts, and the increasingly burdensome property taxes. Districts which qualify for only flat grants are in the position of exploiting either an expenditure advantage or a tax advantage. If the district chooses an expenditure advantage, it can easily exceed what less wealthy districts spend for schools simply because of its large tax base. For any tax rate, the greater the property valuation per membership above the statewide guaranteed valuation, the greater the possible educational expenditures per membership, if such a district chooses an expenditure advantage. On the other hand, a district with a valuation above the statewide guarantee may choose a tax advantage. For any expenditure level per pupil, the greater the property valuation per membership, the lower the tax rate.[43]

Another concern with the way in which Wisconsin schools are funded deals with non-aidable educational costs.[44] Equalization aids apply only to net operating costs thereby excluding capital outlay and interest on debt. With a local tax base varying from $15,000 to $150,000 in full valuation per pupil, the differential between the richest district and the poorest district in building a facility requiring principal and interest payments of $100 per pupil is a range of .67 to 6.67 mills. The poorer district, in this instance, must exert ten times the tax effort to construct a similar school facility.

A final area of inequitability in school financing in Wisconsin has to do with cost controls. Some of these controls were enacted by the legislature first in 1969 and again in 1971. Cost controls refer to maximum school expenditures per pupil above which state aid or sharing in costs cease.[45] Districts choosing to spend in excess of this maximum may do so but without any state aid. In 1969, the legislature made two moves in an attempt to curb the rising costs of schools because the existing law

establishing a maximum mill levy provided that the state pay 100 per cent of the costs over the ceiling.[46] The statutory ceiling on the property tax mill rate was eliminated by the 1969 legislature. In place of this ceiling was a cost control for the payment of state aids which amounted to 110 per cent of the state average net operating cost per membership. Thus, any school district choosing to spend more than 110 per cent of the statewide average net operating cost per membership had to do so entirely without state general assistance. The reason for this move was that school costs were rising much faster than increases in property valuation. The biennial adjustment in the state guarantee property valuation, furthermore, was not adequate to compensate for the slower growth in property valuation. Table 8 illustrates this rise in mill rates.

TABLE 8

ANNUAL CHANGES IN COST, GUARANTEED VALUATION, AND MILL RATES FROM 1966 THROUGH 1971

Year	Average Net Operating Cost Per Pupil	Guaranteed Valuation Per Pupil	Average Required Operating Mill Rate
1966-67	477	38,000	12.55
1967-68	531	39,000	13.61
1968-69	607	39,000	15.56
1969-70	673	42,000	16.02
1970-71	764	43,500	17.56

SOURCE: "The Operating Mill Levy Index and The Partnership for Equality of Educational Opportunity," Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, Madison, 1972.

The legislature, in 1971, made changes in the cost control limits.[47] This amendment to the state statutes reduced the percentage ceiling from 110 to 105 on the recommendation of the Governor in his Executive Budget. There was an exception to the lower ceiling of 105 per cent in the case of integrated K-12 districts with per membership equalized valuations below the state average. On the initiative of a Democratic Representative active in education affairs, a proposal was made to have a two per cent "add on" for districts with low valuation, and this was adopted. This increased the cost

control limit by two per cent for each full $1,000 a district fell below the average per pupil valuation, up to a maximum of 120 per cent.

Initially, in 1971, the Governor had requested a ceiling of 100 per cent but some educational interest groups have pressed for a higher ceiling of 115 per cent. These active groups included the Wisconsin Association of School Boards, and the Milwaukee Public Schools, with some help from the Wisconsin Education Association. By the process of legislative compromise it was decided that the ceiling should not fall below 100 per cent. The 105 per cent ceiling was then acceptable to the Governor, and it prevailed. At the same time, the Department of Public Instruction and some of the educational interest groups got the 120 per cent they had advocated for those districts with low valuation per membership. The state would not provide any aid beyond the maximum of 120 per cent. This 120 per cent ceiling would not have been attained were it not for the two per cent "add on." It is reported that this two per cent "add on" was an acceptable figure to nearly all legislators, since it would not adversely affect any district but, in fact, would assist the poorer districts. As a result, this "add on" was not difficult to pass. Its origin was in the Democratically-controlled Assembly where it encountered no difficulty, but it was not approved by the Senate until the Conference Committee report was submitted.

The Republican-controlled Senate originally wanted to retain the 1969 cost control limit of 110 per cent, a figure set by the previous Republican administration. Since the Governor and the Assembly requested a ceiling of 100 per cent, the matter was referred to a Conference Committee of both houses of the legislature. From this committee came the eventual compromise of a 105 per cent ceiling, but not until after the education interest groups had lobbied long and hard against a 100 per cent ceiling and some taxpayer groups lobbied against either a 110 or a 115 per cent ceiling.

It must be understood that the cost control proposal was a small part of the Budget Bill, but it was important to public school finance. The Governor wanted to prevent overspending on the part of the schools as well as to free additional state resources for low valuation districts. A realistic cost control ceiling to be included in the Budget Bill seemed to be practical. Because it was a part of the Budget Bill, there was not much floor debate on this particular proposal. Rather, the debate and decision-making took place in the Conference Committee and in party caucuses.

Concerning the enactment of the cost control decision, most of the people who were interviewed felt that the Governor demonstrated the most flexibility in that he did not get as much as he had proposed yet was willing to compromise at 105 per cent. The Department of Public Instruction got its 120 per cent ceiling, but both DPI and most of the educational interest groups were still against the concept of lowering the cost control ceiling. They were successful in seeing that the real beneficiaries of the higher cost control provision were the low property valuation districts. The DPI opposed the idea of depriving school districts of funds merely because they chose to spend more than others. In many cases overspending was reasonable, and under such circumstances the DPI felt that the districts should not be penalized by having their local leeway reduced.

The Wisconsin Association of School Boards was also against "the limitation of aid based on cost" since this was seen as "shortsighted" particularly in the area of transportation costs. According to the Association, costs were often incurred because the schools were required to transport students who attended private schools. The cost control limitations were seen as unreasonable to many school districts which, through no fault of their own, were required to spend more funds in order to provide services mandated by the legislature.

Similarly, the Wisconsin Education Association was opposed to an "unrealistic ceiling." The organization contended that by placing a limit on the amount of money that the schools spend there would be curtailment of important educational programs since there were about 168 school districts affected by the cost control ceiling. There was also concern that teacher retirement benefits would be adversely affected.

Wisconsin's problems with its method of financing schools in the early 1970s are a matter of record. The legislature has not increased the guaranteed valuation at a rate consonant with rising school costs. As net operating costs have risen more rapidly in recent years, state general aid has not been able to match this cost increase. The resultant gap between school costs and state aid could only be filled by increased burden on the local property tax. Feeling the public pressure against continually increasing the mill rate on property, the 1969 legislature substituted cost control ceilings in place of maximum mill rate. As a recent blue ribbon committee states it, spending controls can:

> 1) Protect the state against exorbitant demands for state aid;
> 2) Guard the property taxpayer against excessive property tax rates; and
> 3) Help to assure the equal availability of educational services.[48]

In assessing the results of cost controls, the committee said: "Whether this control meets the first objective is questionable; it simply ignores the second; and achieves the opposite of the third."[49] Present controls have no effect upon wealthier flat rate districts. Flat aid districts receive so little aid that limitations do not really discourage them from high spending. By placing no specific restrictions on wealthier districts and by making the spending of districts below the statewide average guaranteed value per pupil totally dependent on property wealth, the cost control

ceilings were not achieving the desired objectives.

Move for Reform - Urgent demands for new directions in financing the school system in Wisconsin came from all sections of the population--parents, scholars, taxpayers, students, politicians, and educational officials--each raised serious questions over the inequities of a financing system which depended on the property tax. Sensing widespread discontent with school finance, the Governor by Executive Order created the Governor's Task Force on Educational Financing and Property Tax Reform in January, 1972. The Executive Order included these statements:

> Each child has the right to equality in educational opportunity; the present reliance on local property taxes as the primary source of revenue for public elementary and secondary school expenditures denies this basic right by fostering fiscal discrimination; the present system of financing public education creates wide disparities in property tax burdens throughout the state and makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents or community; and the disparity in property taxation has come under attack by court rulings in other states and by the initiation of court action in Wisconsin...[50]

There were three charges given to the Task Force, summarized as follows:

> 1. Re-examination of the whole basis for financing public elementary and secondary education in Wisconsin.
> 2. Making recommendations for shifting the base of elementary and secondary school funding from the local property tax to other means of public support.
> 3. Incorporating the recommendations in a final report to be submitted within one year.[51]

Comprised of forty-seven members, the Task Force included representatives of citizens' groups, professional educators, school board members, interest group representatives, members of the legislature, and members of labor and student groups. There appeared to be a balance between educators and non-educators, and all geographical areas within the state were represented. Six public hearings were held in different cities. The Executive Director had worked formerly for both the Department of Public Instruction and then for the Department of Administration as a budget analyst. For twelve months the

Task Force met once monthly and attendance was excellent, which may have indicated the general interest of the members.

Support of public education had grown increasingly burdensome on local property tax payers in Wisconsin. As shown by Table 9, Wisconsin homeowners had reason to complain about the property tax burden.

TABLE 9

EXTENT OF PROPERTY TAX BURDEN IN WISCONSIN

Category	Rank of Wisconsin	Amount	United States Average
Per Capita property tax revenue of state and local governments, 1970-71.	8	$231	$184
Per capita property tax revenue of local governments, 1970-71.	11	$214	$178
Property tax revenue of states and local governments as proportion of totai tax revenue, 1970-71.	17	43%	40%
State and local property tax collections in 1970-71 as proportion of personal income in 1971.	5	6%	4%

SOURCE: Rankings of the States, 1973, National Education Association, Washington, 1973, pp. 39-45.

Wisconsin schools received 50 per cent of all the property tax revenues in the state. This revenue from local sources, in the 1971-72 school year, amounted to 65.4 per cent of all public school revenues, thus ranking Wisconsin 9th among states compared with the U. S. average of 51.8 per cent.[52] In state fiscal support of education, Wisconsin was ranked 39th with 30.4 per cent compared with the U. S. average of over 40 per cent. Federal sources amounted to only 4.3 per cent of Wisconsin's total school revenue, ranking the Badger State 47th, while the U. S. average was 8 per cent. In property tax revenue increase, Wisconsin experienced an increase of 166 per cent in the 1960s, but the property tax base expanded only 78 per cent.[53] Mill rates soared toward the end of the decade, as documented earlier in this report.

The regressivity of the present method of financing public schools in

Wisconsin has been reviewed. The inadequacies represented, in the words of the Task Force, the following: various forms of wealth discrimination, including provisions whereby wealthy districts were given either an expenditure or tax advantage; flat aids, where wealthy districts received per pupil grants from the state; non-aidable educational costs, where significant educational costs were not defrayed by state sources; and cost controls which, rather than limit spending, imposed no fiscal controls in wealthy districts.

The consequences of wealth discrimination result in wide disparities in spending for educational services which are directly related to property wealth. Table 10 illustrates this important point made by the Task Force.

TABLE 10

PER CENT OF DISTRICTS BY SPENDING LEVELS IN CATEGORIES OF PROPERTY WEALTH FOR 378 SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN WISCONSIN, 1970-1971

Expenditures Per Pupil	Property Valuation Per Pupil				
	$20,440	$20,440+ to 26,358	$26,358+ to 33,657	$33,657+ to 165,000	Total Per Cent
$693 and less	8.73	6.88	6.61	3.17	25.40
$693+ to $747	7.94	6.35	5.56	5.56	25.40
$747+ to $801	3.97	6.61	8.20	5.82	24.60
$801+ to $1,450	4.50	5.03	4.76	10.32	24.60
Total	25.13	24.87	25.13	24.87	100.00

SOURCE: The Governor's Task Force on Educational Financing and Property Tax Reform, draft of Final Report, Madison, February 1973, p. 23.

The percentage in a given spending category varied directly with the district's property wealth. Lower spending districts tended to be the poorer districts in property valuation per pupil. Correspondingly, districts spending more had higher per pupil property valuations.

After its intensive examination of school financing, the Governor's Task Force made a series of final recommendations, summarized as follows:

1. Every school district was to be guaranteed the same wealth base as measured by property value for each pupil.

2. School spending controls would be implemented to insure property tax relief and reduce spending disparities among districts.

3. The state should provide funding sufficient to reduce local property tax rates to an average of 15 mills.

4. Aidable costs would be expanded to include interest on long-term debt and capital outlay included in annual budgets, except for building and equiping structures more appropriately financed by bonded indebtedness.

5. A two-year period of adjustment was recommended to ease the transition from reliance on a high wealth base per student to an equalized wealth base per student.[54]

The thrust of the recommendations of the Task Force for school finance lay in the concept of district power equalization. Financing public schools according to this concept would remove the advantage that property rich districts have in providing additional educational opportunities for their students. Each school district would choose a spending figure and determine the tax rate sufficient to generate the revenue for that particular level of spending. According to the recommended formula, a district could spend at the rate of $69.20 for every mill of tax up to $1,005 per pupil, and for every mill of tax over $1,005 per pupil the district could spent $41.66. Where actual property valuations exceeded the guaranteed valuation, the district would have to contribute its excess property tax collections to the state. Should the local tax rate raise less than the chosen expenditure level, the state would make up or guarantee the difference. This limitation, plus certain spending controls imposed on districts above the guaranteed valuation, would mean that Wisconsin's richer districts would return monies to the state to assist in supporting poorer districts. It was estimated that thirty of Wisconsin's 436 school districts would be required to contribute revenue to the state under full power equalization in 1974-1975.[55] Failure to implement this equalization concept, in the view of the Task Force, would

result in unequal educational opportunity and taxpayer inequity, or in an increase in other state taxes in order to defray the expenses of aiding the poorer districts. The concept of power equalization developed into a hotly contested policy issue. It was passed by the Assembly but met stiff opposition in the Senate because of party differences as well as the divisive nature of taking money from wealthy districts to pay the poorer ones. The matter was sent to a Conference Committee for resolution and after weeks of deliberation it was modified so that no district would have to pay back any money to the state until 1976. The Governor and the Democrats have, therefore, gained a victory but the credit is not all theirs. The Republicans will certainly claim their share.

Analysis of School Finance. As a policy issue of increasing significance, school finance decisions have attracted widespread interest among educators, government officials, and citizens. Where decisions about funding schools were once made by incremental adjustments to a foundation formula, a more basic reform was needed. The cumulative effect of rising school costs and property taxes had placed excessive burdens on local property owners.

The progressive nature of Wisconsin state government may be seen by the early recognition of the needs for property tax relief and providing equality of educational opportunity. Yet, like many other states, Wisconsin's aid allocative mechanism had not been able to deal effectively with the inequality among school district spending. Even though state aid designed to equalize was able to reduce a portion of the fiscal inequity among school districts, the disparity among districts continued. Flat grant districts exploited tax or expenditure advantages, non-aidable school costs limited capital construction in poorer districts, and cost controls placed a ceiling on state aid per pupil resulting in continued inequalities in school district spending.

As a means of involving a wide representation of the public sector and

in the progressive spirit of reform, Wisconsin's Governor created a task force which spent a full year on the problems of school finance and property tax reform. The task force recommendation of district power equalization, was designed to give property tax relief by making school spending a measure of effort rather than ability. The revenue necessary to attain this inter-district equalization was to come, in effect, from the fiscal capacity of the wealthier districts. There were to be spending controls imposed on the wealthier districts by the state with revenue in excess of state limits to be returned to the state.

The dual issues of property tax reform and school finance were major issues of public policy being decided in the arena of the Wisconsin legislature. Both educational and economic considerations became tempered by political realities. While the concept of district power equalization was passed by the Democratically-controlled Assembly, it was unsuccessful in the Republican-dominated Senate. The means of resolution centered on a Conference Committee which, in offering a political compromise enabled passage of the bill, diluted the equalization principle somewhat by not requiring any school district to return excess monies to the state until 1976.

Public School Desegregation

In one sense, there were no statewide school desegregation efforts in Wisconsin. Rather than emphasizing the term "desegregation", the Wisconsin officials in the DPI who were responsible for this concern preferred to refer to it as "equal educational opportunity", although both terms were used in the equal educational opportunity guidelines that finally were developed.

It seems well to begin with a brief consideration of the demographic data pertinent to the desegregation issue. In 1970 the reported population of Wisconsin, as previously noted, was 4,418,083. Of this total, 4,258,959

or 96.4 per cent was classified as white and only 159,124 or 3.6 per cent as non-white (see Table II). Still, the population of non-whites in the state has grown steadily since 1950 when it represented a mere 1.2 per cent of the total population.

Because of the relatively few non-white ethnic groups in Wisconsin, desegregation as a policy issue has not been in the limelight, at least at the state level. The concerns are more localized, especially where there are significant numbers of blacks, Native Americans, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans. These groups are concentrated in Milwaukee, Racine, Beloit, Kenosha, and Shawano.[56] In Milwaukee, for instance, more than 30 schools have pupil memberships in excess of 90 per cent minority or non-white.

TABLE II

POPULATION BY RACE IN WISCONSIN, 1970

RACE		POPULATION
White		4,258,959
Non-White		159,124
Black	128,224	
Native Americans	18,924	
Chinese	2,700	
Japanese	2,648	
Filipino	1,209	
All Other	5,067	
All Races		4,418,083

SOURCE: 1971 Wisconsin Blue Book. These figures vary slightly from the U. S. Census figures given earlier.

Minority groups have not been complacent about racial problems. Native Americans, through their organization, VIE (Victory for Indian Education), have been vocal in their demands for equal educational opportunity. Blacks, through the NAACP, the Urban League, and other groups, have attempted to bring pressure to bear on the school districts to improve conditions in black schools, albeit with little success. Mexican-Americans (Chicanos) have been successful in having a bilingual program established for them in Milwaukee and Waukesha. But there have been no indications that any state-level organizations have

applied pressure to any state agency to solve what racial problems there are in Milwaukee or throughout the state.

The evidence shows that so far little has been done at the state level in the area of desegregation in Wisconsin. However, the historical perspective of the DPI on racial imbalance goes back to the term of State Superintendent Angus Rothwell in 1964. It was with his support that the Assistant State Superintendent for Administration wrote the first de facto segregation policy statement. Later, State Superintendent Kahl and the Coordinator for Equal Educational Opportunity became concerned about the problems that were surfacing. The DPI Administrative Council also gave attention to this matter. As a result of this concern, the DPI, in 1972, released a position paper on equal education opportunity. In this paper, the Superintendent of Public Instruction stated that:

> Fundamental to providing equal educational opportunity is the need to eliminate racial and ethnic isolation in our schools and to develop school environments and curricula which provide and promote genuine understanding and mutual respect for people of diverse backgrounds and cultures by students and staff.[57]

Superintendent Kahl went on to state:

> ...The Department of Public Instruction has helped in securing funds to aid schools in eliminating racial and ethnic isolation and preparing for integration. Despite the determination and significant accomplishments of many people working in education, the extent of racial and ethnic isolation has outdistanced those efforts intended to deal with the problem. In some cases, racial and ethnic isolation within and among school districts is increasing.[58]

The actions of the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the DPI indicate that they saw the segregation problem as not only a local concern but also a state issue. And, as the Superintendent put it:

> The state's responsibility to assure equal educational opportunity and to end the practice of racial and ethnic isolation is both a moral and a legal responsibility.[59]

Acting upon the statement that the state should bear the responsibility of assuring equal educational opportunity, the Superintendent with the assistance

of the Coordinator of Equal Educational Opportunity appointed a State Advisory Committee for Equal Educational Opportunity. The Committee was commissioned to make guidelines and recommendations to the State Superintendent. Its composition reflected a cross-section of Wisconsin citizens, including legislators, educators, churchmen and representatives of business. The action-oriented guidelines which the Committee subsequently developed were written with the hope and belief that a cooperative effort of the state and local educational agencies would help in their implementation, once approval had been obtained from the State Superintendent.

It must be pointed out that the Superintendent has no direct formal powers to desegregate the schools in Wisconsin. He has the power, however, of withholding federal funds from schools where there are flagrant violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In addition, the Superintendent can utilize the Administrative Code as well as S.15.04(3) of the Wisconsin Statutes to set up committees to study the problem and to make recommendations to be implemented. But such recommendations might be overturned by the full legislature because they would not be a part of the Administrative Code. The present guidelines may become a part of the Code but only through a time-consuming process.

The salient features of the equal educational opportunity guidelines[60] are summarized below:

1. Identification of segregative procedures, i.e., attendance procedures and policies--determine if students' assignments to schools or attendance centers result in segregating pupils by race or ethnicity; attendance boundaries or zones; site location for new schools--resulting in segregation; staff hiring and assignment--under representation of race hired or assigned.

2. Corrective procedures including elimination and prevention

of segregation; school district reports; review and findings; requirements of a plan to be equitable and nondiscriminatory; submission of plan to eliminate segregative practices; and review of plans and amendments by the State Superintendent who, upon finding that a district fails to or refuses to comply with the requirements of the guidelines would notify the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Wisconsin State Attorney General.

3. Procedures and contents of a desegregation plan: involvement of parents and other citizens in the planning; explicit commitment by a school district; a detailed description of the specific actions to be taken, and a time-table showing dates of initial implementation and completion; employ a method that is educationally sound and administratively and economically feasible; objectives that insure that integration provides an effective learning environment for all children based upon mutual respect for all racial groups and cultures.

4. Developing an effective desegregation plan: the development of a school board policy or resolution recognizing a plan is needed, after which a citizens' group would be formed to assist in developing a desegregation plan for the school system. This citizens' group is to be designated as a desegregation committee for the community which the system serves. The function of the committee is to act as a sounding board and to actually recommend what desegregation plan should be adopted. To such a committee would be delegated as much power as permitted under law or policy of the school board.

The guidelines do not advocate any one method of desegregation. Several alternative methods are suggested but the method chosen should fit the unique

needs of the local school system. The potential alternatives[61] total 14, and any desegregation plan can utilize any one or a combination of these.

One part of the guidelines is the provision for intercultural education toward a cohesive and multiracial society. Whether these guidelines, if implemented, will aid in the alleviation of racial problems is still to be determined, but one caveat is appropriate: the guidelines are not laws. They became regulations after public hearings were held by the State Superintendent, but such regulations will have to be enforced by the new State Superintendent. The public hearings were held for the purpose of gathering information, but such information could not necessarily be used to prevent the enforcement of the regulations by the Superintendent. There were no serious objections to the guidelines at these hearings according to the former Superintendent of Public Instruction.

Indications that school desegregation has not been an issue of much state-level significance in Wisconsin may be seen by the absence of any significant input on the part of the educational interest groups in the formulation of the equal educational opportunity guidelines. These groups did not become involved nor were they asked to be involved. As a spokesman for the Wisconsin School Administrator's Association remarked: "We supported it (the desegregation effort) and even issued statements supporting it but we were not asked to be represented." The WASB also said that it was not asked to participate. There is no evidence to suggest that these interest groups were asked to help formulate the recommendations. There is also no evidence that these groups were present at the public hearings to supply any information. Similarly, there is nothing to indicate that the legislature or the Governor was involved in shaping the recommendations. One person from the DPI who had worked closely with the Advisory Committee said that it was not necessary for either the legislature or Governor to be

involved since the desegregation of the schools was the prerogative of the State Superintendent. This same person intimated that after the guidelines were made public, they were endorsed by the WEA, some school superintendents, the Indian Education Committee, and the Wisconsin Secondary School Administrator's Association. But the WASB displayed no keen interest. A DPI spokesman described the reaction of the WASB as "apathetic acceptance."

By way of summary and analysis, because of the low percentage (3.6) of minority groups living in the state of Wisconsin, desegregation of the schools is not an issue which has attracted much statewide interest. No state-level interest groups have exerted any kind of pressure on the legislature, the Governor, or the State Superintendent. The problems of desegregation are centered in Milwaukee, principally, and in other areas having fairly large concentrations of minority groups. There are over 30 schools in the Milwaukee school district that have more than a 90 per cent minority population. There is, therefore, no doubt that de facto school segregation exists, at least, in Milwaukee, a consequence in part of housing patterns that segregate the races. In this connection, it also should be noted that there are many white non-public schools in the Milwaukee area.

With Milwaukee being what it is, one wonders why there have been no state-level pressures on the state agencies to bring about some measure of desegregation. It would appear that the lobbying efforts of the Milwaukee school system, both at the metropolitan and state levels, have focused on maintaining the status quo. From all indications, the equal educational guidelines surfaced because of the initiative of the former State Superintendent, William Kahl, and the Director of Equal Educational Opportunity, Mr. William Colby. There are indications that Mr. Colby, who is also consultant coordinator for civil rights, was the catalyst behind the desegregation efforts. Certainly, he must be given full credit for initiating a study of the need for desegregation.

As we have pointed out, the present desegregation guidelines are not laws. They are best seen as advice because they are not binding, and as a result of the change of leadership in the DPI (i.e., the State Superintendency) it is difficult to predict future influence of the guidelines. Much depends on whether the present State Superintendent, Dr. Thompson, finds the advice compatible with her philosophy.

It may well be that the guidelines for equal educational opportunity will set off a statewide reaction thereby involving the legislature and perhaps the Governor but, as of late 1972, this was not the case. Greater legislative as well as gubernatorial involvement in desegregation would have occurred if the bill introduced in the last two sessions by Representative Conta had been enacted. This bill attempted to deal with the "segregation" question by requiring the decentralization of the Milwaukee School System. A possible harbinger may also be the pending court case in Milwaukee that challenges the segregation of the Milwaukee school system. Since the attorney for the plaintiffs in this case happens to be Representative Lloyd Barbee, Chairman of the Assembly Judiciary Committee, it is likely that additional legislative involvement by way of the introduction of a bill by Representative Barbee will take place. However, the only program in desegregation was that of the DPI, and the guidelines (1972) were a cautious endeavor.

Certification

In Wisconsin decisions dealing with the certification of teachers are made by the DPI. The Wisconsin legislature has given statutory authority to the DPI in this area. The major functions of the DPI in respect to teacher education generally relate to two kinds of activities: (1) reviewing and approving teacher education programs, and (2) amending and repealing the certification standards contained in the Administrative Code. This Code, in Wisconsin, has the force of law.

A recent change in teacher preparation programs is the requirement that all teacher education candidates shall engage in a variety of learning experiences that will improve their ability to relate effectively to others (others obviously meaning members of both the same and different ethnic, cultural, educational, and socioeconomic groups). One effect of the Administrative Code Requirement, as of the 1973-74 school year, is that all public teacher education institutions must require each teacher education candidate to complete a program in human relations.

The following is a summary of the Administrative Code Requirement in Human Relations[62] (PI 3.03 (1)):

(a) Preparation in human relations, including intergroup relations, shall be included in programs leading to initial certification in education. Institutions of higher education shall provide evidence that preparation in human relations, including intergroup relations...is an integral part of programs leading to initial certification in education and that members of various racial, cultural, and economic groups have participated in the development of such programs.

(b) Such preparation shall include the following experiences:

1. Development of attitudes, skills, and techniques so that knowledge of human relations, including intergroup relations, can be translated into learning experiences for students.

2. A study of values, life styles, and contributions of racial, cultural, and economic groups in American society.

3. An analysis of the forces of racism, prejudice, and discrimination in American life and the impact of these forces on the experience of majority and minority groups.

4. Structured experiences in which teacher candidates have opportunities to examine their own attitudes and feelings about issues of racism, prejudice, and discrimination.

5. Experiences in evaluating the ways in which racism, prejudice, and discrimination can be reflected in instructional materials.

While the Administrative Code has the force of law, the Human Relations Regulations did not undergo the rigors of the legislative process. The demand for this component of the teacher education program was made by a group of concerned citizens, numbering about eight and representing black, white, and Native American racial groups. The initial motivation of this group grew out of the limited opportunity that white children in Madison had to interact with other ethnic groups. Under the leadership of Mrs. Joy Newmann, a social and civil rights worker, the group decided that the views of white students in Madison were too parochial and the students were not equipped to cope with racial problems. As a means of offering some solution, the group felt that changes had to be made in teacher certification. Consequently, it presented its proposal to the Madison School Board which accepted it in principle but established no requirements. The school board supported an on-going steering committee to study the problem.

The strategy of the Citizen's Group, from then on, was to involve the DPI so that the DPI would be seen as initiating the demand rather than reacting to the suggestions of the group. Thereafter, the Director of the Bureau for Teacher Education and Certification, Dr. Lond Rodman, and the Coordinator for Equal Educational Opportunity, Mr. William Colby, were invited to join in the discussions that the group held in an office of the Equal Educational Opportunity Commission. Dr. Rodman admitted that he steered the group toward the human relations consideration. By the 22nd of December, 1971, it was agreed that the human relations "experience" was important if

teachers were to perform effectively their role of instructing pupils who come from a variety of backgrounds.

The Citizen's Group was expanded to make the issue a state concern and Mrs. Joy Newmann was chosen Chairman of the State Committee on Human Relations. This was a voluntary group and included two doctoral students at the University of Wisconsin who made studies of what the other states were doing in this area. An Advisory Committee on Teacher Certification was appointed by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to review the human relations proposal, and the Committee basically approved it. Then the DPI held a public hearing although it was not a requirement. On July 1, 1973, the human relations requirement became operative.

Prior to July 1, 1973, the teacher education institutions developed programs that would meet the requirements of the human relations experience. These programs were submitted to the Director of Teacher Education and Certification of the DPI for approval. It was reported that some teacher training institutions were opposed to the human relations component being included in their programs. They contended that such an approach was provided already in the preparation of teachers. However, they finally yielded. These institutions were expected to alter or add courses to their programs. But the only review that took place was a check by the Director of Teacher Education and Certification.

The WEA felt that all teacher training programs should be updated and brought together, and that nothing should be done on a piece-meal basis. It took the position that the human relations requirement was only a token effort and insisted that public hearings should be held before it became a part of the Administrative Code. As for the WASB, this organization said it was not asked to make any contribution and volunteered none. On the other hand, the Association of School District Administrators said it worked closely with Dr. Rodman and endorsed the idea.

There seems to be a close relationship between the desegregation guidelines and the human relations proposal. With both programs coming out of the Department of Public Instruction, there is reason to believe that this agency felt that it was time for state intervention. It appears that Mr. Colby was instrumental in having both proposals formulated. The Citizen's Group was aware of the limitations of white students in dealing with racial problems as well as the growing discontent of the minority groups. In addition, the Citizen's Group may have felt that the conditions made a mockery of the equal educational opportunity section of the Wisconsin statutes, for the programs of the schools appeared to be geared toward the needs of the white school population and almost ignored the needs of minority groups. Therefore, one must give credit to the Citizen's Group but the response of the DPI must also be recognized. Dr. Rodman and Mr. Colby certainly provided tangible leadership.

In summary, an Administrative Code Requirement in Human Relations resulted from the actions of a rather small group of citizens who wanted improvement in teacher training programs. They felt that the white students were ill-prepared to deal with racial problems because these students were too isolated from other ethnic groups. By extension, the white teachers were also ill-prepared to deal with the problems of children who were of a different background and race. The Citizen's Group was able to utilize the services of the Madison School Board and the DPI to effect the change which it thought was necessary. Such change came about because this group worked behind the scenes and allowed the DPI to get the credit. Even so, the DPI must be seen as being very receptive to the suggestions and it used its authority to effect the changes despite some opposition.

Educational Improvement Program

The educational scene seldom, if ever, is without excitement and action. There is always a need for improvement as society undergoes a multiplicity of changes. In Wisconsin, as elsewhere, there have been many expressions of concern about educational accountability. Thus, accountability, or more precisely the State Pupil Assessment Program, is the issue area selected to represent the educational improvement program. Indications suggest that an interest in accountability began in the 1950s but was accelerated in the 1960s by the rocketing cost of education and the clamor for results commensurate with costs.

Because of intense concern over the educational process, a variety of approaches for fostering accountability have been proposed. Out of this concern grew the concept of educational assessment. Although many states conducted statewide testing programs for years, such programs were often narrowly conceived and as such primarily benefited local school systems, rather than serving the assessment needs of the state.

In 1969 the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction under the aegis of Title III, ESEA conducted a statewide assessment of educational needs. As a result of this assessment, it was found that reading was the state's number one need. Thereafter, the Superintendent of Public Instruction appointed a reading task force to make specific recommendations for a "Right to Read" effort in Wisconsin. The task force utilized the state and national "Right to Read Committees" in formulating its recommendations. Although reading was an important need it was not the only consideration of the task force. Mathematics was added as an area to be assessed in the first year of the program.[63]

The assessment program must be seen against a background of educational finance. Because of the investment of millions of dollars in the educational

system, the assessment program was seen as a necessity to measure the degree to which the quality of education received by each student in the state justified the expenditure of so much money. In other words, the assessment program was designed to measure how effectively the educational dollar was being used to meet the needs of the students. Important as this reason was, it was not the only one for the establishment of the assessment program. In order for a state to receive Title III ESEA funds it had to develop a needs assessment program. Coupled with that requirement there was also interest displayed by staff members, particularly a doctoral intern from the University of Wisconsin who was also working at the DPI. He was assigned to develop this area. The general interests of the DPI staff were merged with the Title III requirements into a unified program.

In January of 1971, the Wisconsin legislature charged the Department of Public Instruction with carrying out this educational assessment. Chapter 125, Laws of Wisconsin, 1971 115.28 (10) deals with this legislation and states that the DPI should:

> Develop an educational assessment program to measure objectively the adequacy and efficiency of educational programs offered by public schools in this state. The program shall include, without limitation because of enumeration, methods by which pupil achievement in fundamental course areas, as set forth in S. 118.01 (1), and other areas of instruction commonly offered by public schools, will be objectively measured each year. Assessment shall be undertaken at several grade levels on a uniform statewide basis.[64]

The demand for legislation of this type was initiated by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction who presented the proposal to the Governor, who in turn included it in his budget bill because he felt that it was a popular issue which had both state and national significance. A point of interest here is that in Wisconsin after the Governor submits his budget bill, it then goes to the Joint Committtee on Finance where it is scrutinized and amended so that what eventually goes to the floor of the

house for debate is a substitute amendment. If the Assembly and the Senate fail to agree on the passage of a bill, it is sent to a bipartisan conference committee where most of the compromises are made before the bill is finally sent to the Governor for him to sign. In the 1971 session, the substitute amendment went to the Assembly because that house was controlled by the Governor's party. From the Assembly, the bill then went to the Republican-controlled Senate where it was carefully scrutinized. Passage of the 1971 budget bill including the provision for the state assessment program ultimately came after lengthy deliberation by a bipartisan conference committee.

No funds were appropriated by the legislature for the educational assessment program at the time the law was passed. This may well have been a very important factor in the bill's passage since no fiscal note was attached to it. The general expectation was that the DPI would be able to fulfill the mandate by reallocating some state and federal funds. Another factor which helps explain the relative ease with which the legislation was passed was that it was a minor part of the budget bill. The dominant issue at that time was the merger of the university systems, a proposal which was later removed from the budget before passage and was adopted as a separate Senate Bill. A final reason for inclusion of assessment in the budget bill, and the lack of opposition to its inclusion, was that most legislators were enthusiastic about the idea.

After the development of the educational goals, they were translated into performance objectives by program specialists from around the state. Sub-objectives reflected the ideal expectations of each program. The assessment instruments that were constructed were criterion-referenced tests, that is, all exercises were based on specific learning objectives. These objectives were stated in terms of the behavioral changes expected in students as a result of instructional programs and did not merely invoke standings

on national norms. Test exercises were then developed to measure each objective. Thus, the objectives and their respective test exercises-became the quality criteria by which the adequacy of the programs can be judged.

In May, 1973, two groups of students were sampled: those in their third year of school (excluding kindergarten), and those in their seventh year of school (excluding kindergarten). Approximately 11,000 students were selected from a stratified random sample of districts on the basis of the size and instructional expenditure per pupil. There was then a random sample of the students from within each selected district. Skills and knowledge in reading and mathematics were assessed. No individual or school district was to be identified by name.

The educational interest groups all worked in some fashion with the DPI on the assessement program and there was no indication of any major opposition to it. The Wisconsin Association of School District Administrators said it worked with the DPI and offered no tangible opposition. The Wisconsin Association of School Boards participated in the development of the plan and worked on the steering Committee as well as on the Advisory Committee on implementation. Also serving on one of the committees was the WEA which complained that the program was insufficiently funded and that the random sample was not large enough. The Wisconsin Secondary School Administrator's Association said it was "greatly involved" in the program, but that it had opposed a part of the original proposal--that of tying the amount of state aid to the degree of achievement. This part was later excluded.

The results of the assessment program will be reported as a state performance although limited analyses by types of districts based on size and per pupil institutional expenditure may be reported. It is planned that the assessment results may be used at federal, state, and local levels.

Mention was made of the absence of any appropriations for the assessment program when the legislature first passed the legislation in January of 1971.

But in July of 1972, $26,000 was allocated for the first year's planning activities. This amount of money did not come directly from the legislature but from the Board of Government Operations. Since then a total of approximately $90,000 (inclusive of the $26,000) has been allocated for operational costs. Much of the money for the program comes from Title III (ESEA) and Section 402 (of the General Services Act) funds. Still, DPI sources claim there is not enough money to fund the program adequately.

In summary, because millions of dollars were being invested in education each year, it seemed necessary to legislators and others in Wisconsin to measure the quality of education that was being received by students. Because no fiscal note was attached to the proposal when it was introduced in the legislature; because it was incorporated into the Governor's budget bill and had his support; and because it was a popular issue at state and national levels, educational assessment legislation was passed without difficulty. But it does appear that the program is not sufficiently funded by the legislature and this has caused the DPI to use other funds, chiefly federal funds, to help carry out the program.

SECTION IV

ANALYSIS OF STATE EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING

The United States Constitution does not make specific reference to education and it is only by implication that provisions for education can be undertaken at the federal level. Consequently, education becomes the legal responsibility of the states. The Wisconsin Constitution states (in Article X, Section 3), "The Legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools..." The Wisconsin Statutes, 121.01, point out: "It is declared to be the policy of this state that education is a state function..."

Although federal, state, and local educational governments interact on policies, only the statutes of the states give details as to state educational governance. There has been much controversy as to whether educational policy should reside with governors, state legislatures, state boards of education, chief state school officers, or combinations of two or more of these agencies or offices. In Wisconsin, formal power resides in a combination of actors, chief among which are the Governor, the legislature, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction. Educational interest groups also help to shape educational policy making. It is the purpose of this section to analyze this state education policy system, pointing out what essential relationships exist, possible explanations for these relationships, and any anticipated changes in relationships.

Educational Interest Groups

Our analysis begins with a discussion of the educational interest groups because of their historical importance in the policy-making process. Over the years some of these groups--notably the Wisconsin Association of School Boards, the Wisconsin Education Association, and the Milwaukee Public

Schools Association--established strong working relationships with the Department of Public Instruction and the education committees of the legislature and so played an important role in helping the legislature to shape educational policies.

Whether by sheer numerical strength, monetary contributions, political savvy, or respected expertise, interest groups exert some degree of influence on the policy-making process. in Wisconsin the major educational interest groups include the Wisconsin Association of School Boards (WASB), the Wisconsin Education Association (WEA), the Wisconsin Secondary School Administrators Association (WSSAA), the Wisconsin Association of School District Administrators (WASDA), the Milwaukee Public Schools Association (MPSA), the Wisconsin Congress of Parents and Teachers Association (WCPTA), and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). But the last two organizations, in the estimation of most of the persons we interviewed, have very little influence at the state level in Wisconsin.

During the 1960s there was a state-level educational coalition comprised of some of the most influential groups. At that time the WASB, WEA, and the Milwaukee School District worked closely with the DPI in an attempt to help shape educational policy. During this period, the Superintendent of Public Instruction represented and often spoke for the coalition. He was also the most important single source of advice to the Governor. The chief spokesman of the coalition to the legislature, however, was the Executive Secretary of the Association of School Boards. The team of Kahl (DPI), Buchmiller (DPI), Tipler (WASB), Weinlick (WEA); and, on many occasions, Tom Linton (Milwaukee Schools) worked harmoniously and presented generally a unified front on educational matters. However, the coalition broke up as positions on educational issues began to reflect teachers versus management and state versus local interests.

The modus operandi of the coalition--professionalism, non-political involvement, and low-keyed "objective" lobbying--became obsolete as teachers and municipal employees gained collective bargaining rights. According to many interviewees, the teachers became militant and political and the end result was the demise of the educational coalition. The WEA implied that the teachers, in particular,became disenchanted with the degree of influence their organization and the coalition had with the legislature. The WEA rank-and-file saw their association playing second fiddle to the WASB and resented this especially after having gained bargaining rights. Thereafter, an employee/employer conflict developed between the two associations. It is no wonder, therefore, that a schism developed and the coalition is now very much fragmented.

The Wisconsin Education Association. Following the break up of the old coalition, and with the more political and militant posture taken by the teachers, the WEA is on the threshold of becoming the most influential interest group within the state. What accounts for the transition? Toward the latter part of 1972--prior to the national elections--the WEA established a political arm known as the Wisconsin Educators Politically Active and Concerned (WEPAC), and the Wisconsin Teachers Assistance Fund (WTAF). The first organization aimed at endorsing political candidates for national, state, and local office. It was intended that the greatest impact would be on legislative and state constitutional offices (e.g., Governor, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and legislators). Membership in this organization was voluntary and members paid an annual fee of $5.00. With nearly 50,000 members there was a potential dollar strength of close to a quarter of a million dollars. With such money and such a large membership there was potential political clout, for membership translates into votes, votes win elections, and elected officials casting their votes create public policy.

Some degree of the WEA's strength may be assessed by the success the organization had endorsing candidates in the 1972 elections. A WEA source disclosed that the association endorsed some 80 candidates and spent approximately $40,000 in the process. The result was nearly 85 per cent success. With political adroitness, the association used the voting records of legislators (on educational matters) for or against candidates to convince teachers, parents, and the general electorate of the wisdom of its endorsements. Sources outside of WEA, however, claimed that many of the candidates endorsed by WEA were running unopposed and election results therefore inflated the degree of WEA's success.

Through WEPAC, the WEA had endorsed the candidacy of Mr. Ernest Korpella as State Superintendent for the 1973 elections. Although WEA borrowed $25,000 from a Madison Bank, mostly to finance the campaign of Korpella,[65] their endorsee did not win. His opponent, Dr. Barbara Thompson, an educational consultant employed by the Department of Public Instruction, made it plain that a major issue of the campaign was teacher strikes; that only salaries and employee welfare should be negotiated with the teachers. Dr. Thompson won the election handsomely although Korpella had received the most votes in the primary election.

Despite the strength of organized labor and WEA's endorsement, Korpella's loss leads one to ask how much influence did the WEA have? Did the WEA lose influence in the election? A top officer in the WEA was quick to reply "no" to such questions and to assert that immediately after the election the WEA was successful in getting legislation passed for higher teacher retirement benefits. But this ignores the fact that the WEA's active guidance of the Korpella campaign resulted in a resounding defeat for their candidate and perhaps for their policies. Dr. Thompson's success at the polls may have been influenced to some extent by the fact that she had a Ph.D. degree in educational administration while her opponent had only a M.Ed.

The other voluntary organization (the WTAF) was created by the WEA for the purpose of providing teachers with financial assistance in bargaining disputes. Assistance may also be provided in the event of a legal battle in which teachers are engaged.

Aside from these new organizations, other factors contributing to the WEA's rising influence are:

1. The new and bold leadership of the present Executive Director who has been described by the President of WEA as "intelligent, wise, and meets issues head on." The President must also be seen as a catalyst for action. There appears to be no cleavage in the leadership, although there are rifts in the rank and file membership on political action.

2. The close association with labor unions and the municipal groups thereby forming an informal coalition where each side supports the other. An alliance with the labor unions in a state where unionism is strong does give some stature to the WEA. There is also a close link with the National Farmer's Organization (NFO). This combination adds up to mobilization and political clout.

3. The lobbying strength residing in four registered lobbyists, one of whom spends full-time with the legislature when it is in session. There is also a field representative who works with the local organizations as well as one public relations person working on political matters. The strategy of the full-time lobbyist is to be "objective" in providing information, giving "individual memos that are brief, factual and simple in language" to legislators. The information, however, is given by taking "positive positions" or "advocating" rather than just "submitting." The WEA views lobbying as an essential

part of its activity. As one WEA officer puts it: "You have to make yourself available at any hour of the day."

4. A research division comprised of four staff members, one of whom is a full-time professional. This gives the association a good information generating capability.

5. The reported nexus with both the Governor and the Department of Administration (DOA). One observer remarked that it appears that WEA is on a "honeymoon trip" with the Governor. Another observer stated that "the Governor has paid attention to WEA." It seems as if WEA enjoys a direct communication to the Governor and this communication has blossomed into a mutual political partnership.

The WEA is looked upon by the legislators as well as other groups as offering a stiff challenge to the leadership of the WASB. When legislators or their staffs were asked what groups or individuals provided the most useful information about the public schools, they rated WEA second (along with the WASB) to the DPI. These legislators also see the WEA as being among the most influential educational groups when it comes to education and school finance matters dealt with by the legislature. In this role WEA and the WASB shared honors for being the most influential. No other group received half as high a rating as these two organizations.

That the WEA is now beginning to exert influence is without question. The organization claims that it was able to change the direction of the Governor's Task Force on Educational Financing and Property Tax Reform "about 180°." Some informed sources in educational circles express the belief that the WEA's influence in shaping state educational policy is so great that the power equalization concept proposed for the 1973-75 biennium was the result of not only the Task Force recommendations, but also the co-operation between the Governor's staff (including the DOA) and the WEA.

By establishing an alliance with the Governor, the WEA has much to gain. The Governor is perceived as a strong leader and as having much influence with Democratic legislators, especially in the Assembly which is controlled by the Democrats. For this reason, the Governor does not have much difficulty in getting his proposals (some of which may originate with the WEA) passed by the Assembly. Even more important is the fact that formulation of the budget is within the Governor's office.

Assuming that there is a very cordial relationship between WEA and the Governor, and further assuming that this relationship continues and that Governor Lucey wins another term of office in 1974, it seems likely that the WEA will emerge as the dominant educational interest group in Wisconsin. Such a situation, however, does hinge on whether the Democrats maintain their hold on the Assembly and make at least some gains in the Senate. This does not mean that the WEA works only with the Democrats in the legislature but their chief link is to the Governor who is a Democrat.

The Wisconsin Association of School Boards. Once the voice of the educational interest groups, the WASB is now seriously challenged by the WEA. In former years the WASB was a respected and forceful group. Their Executive Director, George Tipler, was looked upon as a major source of advice on educational policy. He established warm personal relationships with many legislators and with former Governor Warren Knowles. He was respected and admired for his professionalism and objectivity. "The Association," said one interviewee, "is looked upon more as a public voice than as an interest group." George Tipler is the same man today--respected, admired, and influential with many legislators--but WEA's aggressive stance along with its visibility in the political arena has tended to reduce the influence of the WASB.

The WASB did not enjoy as close a relationship with Governor Lucey and the policies he espoused as it did with Governor Knowles. Thus, one avenue of its influence began to wane. Still, the legislators we interviewed respect George Tipler and his organization, and they tend to express confidence in that body. WEA and WASB were judged by the lawmakers to exert equal influence on the legislature on education and school finance matters. The political involvement of the WEA coupled with the apolitical stance of the School Boards Association has contributed to the erosion of influence of the WASB. The WASB claims that school boards are public entities, and as such cannot be as politically involved as the WEA. Yet this contention is questionable, since Town Boards and County Boards do become politically involved.

With the WEA breaking away from the WASB (and the old educational coalition), a void was created and it appears that the WASB joined forces with the administrator groups to try to fill this void. There is now a loose coalition known as the Wisconsin Council of School Administrative Associations (WCSAA), also called the "Administrative Umbrella." The WASB is not a member of this council but is closely affiliated with it. Included in this coalition are the following groups:

Wisconsin Association of School District Administrators	(WASDA)
Wisconsin Secondary School Administrators Association	(WSSAA)
Wisconsin Elementary School Administrators Association	(WESAA)
Wisconsin Association of School Business Officials	(WASBO)
Wisconsin Society for Curriculum Development	(WSCD)
Wisconsin Personnel Administrators Association	(WPAA)

A matter worthy of note is that no person on the WEA staff made mention of this coalition. In fact, when they were asked if there were such a coalition their reply was "no." The representative from the Congress of Parents and Teachers did not know of this coalition, either. Such a coalition does exist. It has a newly-selected Executive Secretary, as well as a lobbyist,

in the person of ex-Representative Manny S. Brown. Leadership in this coalition is provided by the Secondary School Administrators. The coalition is just beginning to exert influence at the state level, playing an effective role in the election of the present State Superintendent.

Lacking in influence with the Governor and losing some of its influence with the legislature, the WASB now seeks to align itself with the school district administrators. Indeed, these two groups were the only ones seen by the legislators interviewed as acting together on legislative issues. The reason given for this "togetherness" was, invariably, commonality of interest. Apart from the District Administrator's group, the WASB works with the DPI and there are indications that there will be closer ties with the DPI now that a new Superintendent of Public Instruction has taken office. During the superintendent's election race the newly-elected Superintendent, Dr. Thompson, was anti-WEA, making the allegation that the WEA was attempting to increase its strength in the state and gain control of the DPI. It appeared that the School Boards were sympathetic toward the candidate opposing the WEA's endorsee in the run-off election of March 6, 1973. Since the WEA's endorsee lost, and DPI-WEA relations are less cordial, the WASB may have gained a strong ally in the person of Superintendent Thompson. As part of the alignments of the WASB it is well to note that all the public employer groups, according to the WASB, have become something of a new alliance and that WASB plays a prominent role in the alliance. This alliance claims to have significant influence in fiscal and personnel policy making.

It would appear, however, that if the WASB is to maintain its leadership role as an educational interest group it must do one or more of the following: (a) change its strategy from one of appeal through respect to

that of advocate, (b) strengthen its ties with the DPI and the other interest groups, and (c) establish rapport with the Governor.

The Department of Public Instruction and the State Superintendent

Educators tend to see a state department of education (referred to as Department of Public Instruction in Wisconsin) as implementing the policy decisions made by a state board of education. Whereas this may be true for most of the states in the Union, it is not applicable to Wisconsin since there is no state board. There is a State Board of Vocational Education but it has no control over elementary and secondary schools. Since there is no state board of education in Wisconsin where are the policy decisions made? They are made by the legislature, although certain policies are delegated to the DPI and increasingly to the DOA as well.

The legislature does make policy decisions but does the DPI play an active role in the formulation of policy demands? Our data suggest that the Department of Public Instruction did not play a significant role in policy making. Traditionally, state departments of education have been seen as responding to rather than exercising leadership, and the DPI in Wisconsin is no exception. Three factors which seemed to militate against any strong leadership role of the DPI were: (1) the activity of the DOA in the educational arena, (2) the legislature's development of its own staff and its suspicion of the bureaucracy in the DPI, and (3) the DPI's conflict with local school administrators over that agency's handling of federal program requirements. These will be discussed separately.

The Department of Administration is the budget arm of the Governor's office. During the administration of Governor Warren Knowles, the relationship between the educational Cabinet and the Governor was harmonious. But with Governor Lucey this relationship deteriorated to the extent that, so far, Lucey has had only one Cabinet meeting with the educators. At the

head of the DOA is Joe E. Nusbaum who, according to some of the people interviewed, has been given the task of formulating most of the budget policies including those for education. In the words of one newspaper columnist, Nusbaum "has attained power greater than has even been held by any non-elected officer of the state government..." The columnist continued: "...under Lucey, Nusbaum and his circle have been given the opportunity to extend their roles far beyond management and into hundreds of areas involving the most sensitive and vital issues of policy."[66]

One education lobbyist remarked that "the Department of Administration definitely weakens the DPI and this is done with the approval of the Governor. The Department of Administration generates education policy which goes into the Governor's budget...it (the DOA) preempts everything else." Another observer thought that the DOA has "definitely usurped the DPI's functions." It seems, therefore, that the DOA's involvement is a covert action intended to stymie the DPI.

One of the strengths of the DPI has been its ability to provide useful and factual information pertaining to education. It has been able to do so because of the high quality professionals employed in the research division. The availability of computers within the DPI also assisted in generating this information. Recently, however, the DOA requested the removal of the computer system from the DPI to DOA offices. Such a move may point to relegating the DPI to a more passive role in the development of information needed in the formulation of education policies. It appears that it is mainly in the school aid formula that the DPI has had a great input. The quality of the information pertaining to public schools supplied to the legislators by the DPI has been highly valued. Of all the groups that were mentioned as supplying useful information to the legislators (and particularly the Education Committees) the DPI stood above all others, and the

majority of the lawmakers interviewed felt that the information supplied met their needs as they considered educational and school finance bills. Of 16 legislators interviewed, eleven said the DPI's information almost always meets their needs, while four said it usually meets their needs. One person did not reply to this question.

The second factor militating against the DPI was the fact that the Governor and legislature now have their own staffs. One educator complained that "they (the legislators) do not wish to have any leadership from the DPI and this is tragic..." Another educator was even more explicit when he remarked that "...the legislators think they are experts in everything. The emphasis is on the legislative branch and less dependence on the DPI. In fact, they moved the DPI out of the state capitol a few years ago." In light of evidence pointing to the non-political stance of the DPI, it is not easy to understand why the legislators are so suspicious. Perhaps it is due to the fact that the DPI has become an advocate for more state aid to education, thus increasing money demands on the legislature. The DPI is also seen as an advocate for the consolidation of the schools and many legislators resent this, obviously reflecting the views of their constituents. In any case, the legislature has vastly increased its research and information generating capability within the past 5-6 years by providing administrative assistants to leaders, committees, party caucus staffs, and adding strength to the legislative fiscal bureau, and the legislative council among other agencies.

Third, the willingness of the DPI to accept and implement with some vigor a number of federal programs has not enhanced the esteem of the DPI in the eyes of the school administrators in the state.

With the absence of a state board of education in Wisconsin, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction is a constitutional officer elected on a non-partisan basis by the citizens. As a constitutional officer, the

State Superintendent's policy-making authority is restricted to what is contained in the law, but such authority is greater than what is seen at first glance in the law books. In particular, he may formulate regulations under authority of the Administrative Code and these actions have the force of law.

The degree of influence exerted by a chief state school officer depends on many factors. Paramount among such factors in Wisconsin appear to be the strength of the legislature and the Governor. The influence of the State Superintendent is limited by a strong legislature and an aggressive Governor. Indeed, one cannot assert with any degree of certainty that the State Superintendent and the DPI actually draft any of the educational policies passed by the legislature. The DPI may help formulate some policies but the final version is in the hands of the people in the DOA (and the DOA cannot, for practical purposes, be separated from the Governor) and the legislature.

One criterion which may be used to determine the strength and influence of a chief state school officer is his appointive powers. In Wisconsin such appointive powers are constricted by civil service regulations. In fact, such powers include only the appointment of a Deputy Superintendent of Public Instruction, an executive assistant, and an unclassified secretary. This restriction prohibits the Superintendent from establishing his own "team" within the DPI. It also divests him of the freedom to remove administrators in the Department who may not be working in the best interest of its goals. It should be pointed out that if the Deputy Superintendent is promoted from within the DPI, the Superintendent may then appoint an executive assistant. If one is appointed from outside the classified service an executive assistant also becomes the deputy and one appointive position is lost. This has been the case with Superintendent Kahl. These appointed officers serve at the pleasure of the Superintendent. In the case that the Deputy Superintendent is promoted from the classified list of civil servants, his appointment changes his status to unclassified. However, when such appointed term of

office is terminated he may return to the position he previously held, or to one equivalent to it, with full classified status.

Going back to the question of establishing a "team" (the term is used loosely), we find that at one time there was teamwork in the DPI, but with the breakup of the educational coalition about four years ago the "team" also began to disintegrate. This disintegration did not result in the formation of implacable factions; still, some staff members within the DPI felt they were not getting as much as they wished out of the legislature. Beside this, federal programs expanded and there was a feeling of independence on the part of many of the DPI staff. Such people saw themselves more as federal employees and less as an integral part of a state agency.

Superintendent Kahl also did not have full cooperation from within the DPI in implementing a more rigorous management program. Further, he lost support of another faction that was pro-parochiaid when this group realized that he was not in favor of such aid. Perhaps one of the greatest disagreements between staff members and the Superintendent arose when Kahl was accused by some members of the staff of not taking a strong position with the legislature in 1971. At that time, 14 general educational consultant positions (supervisors) were abolished. Another important issue was the removal of the professional qualifications for the State Superintendent by the legislature. Many people felt that Superintendent Kahl did not assert enough influence to prevent this from happening. Admittedly, the Superintendent was fettered by the legislature and the Governor. Yet, as noted by Wirt and Kirst,[67] some chief state school officers have been able to exert substantial independent influence over state policy. Our findings suggest that Superintendent Kahl did not exercise aggressive leadership. The following comments made by legislators give their perspective on the relationship between the State Superintendent and the legislature:

*He tries to please everybody and so hurts everybody. He seldom takes any firm action.

*The CSSO is never controversial...he doesn't rock the boat...he has been a professional educator.

*He doesn't fight...or take the initiative. He takes no advocacy role.

*He is seldom in office...fulfills a public relations function.

*The CSSO maintains a very low profile.

*He is the educator of a few years ago.

*...Vigorous leadership is lacking.

*He doesn't tilt the windmill.

*He stays clear of wheeling and dealing in the legislature.

*His reputation as an educator and his ability to supply information is excellent.

Spokesmen within the educational interest groups portray the CSSO in the following words:

*He is not sensitive to political realities. He thinks the public good prevails.

*He takes an apolitical stance.

*He has not been a leader to bring about any real change. He is a fine man but he doesn't make waves...On the things that he has been successful it is because he proposes something which doesn't take much leadership, so it is easy to pass...He has a good relationship with them (the legislators) but he doesn't push for anything. They respect him as a man...

If we may summarize, the CSSO in Wisconsin is seen as a professional educator who maintains a low public profile, avoids controversy (is not conflict oriented), is non-partisan in his approach both to the Governor and Legislature, exerts little vigorous leadership, and does not ask for too much from the legislature. However, we should note that Superintendent Kahl has not always avoided controversial issues. School reorganization and school finance were two controversial issues upon which he took positions. And many legislators were certainly against school reorganization.

The Superintendent also must be given credit for understanding the limitations of his office and drawing upon the resources within the DPI to support him in his role. Almost every respondent agreed that the Deputy Superintendent, Archie Buchmiller, did a very good job as the DPI liaison with the legislature. Most of the lobbying efforts of the DPI were performed by Buchmiller and he appeared to do so with both vigor and skill. In fact, both the Deputy Superintendent and the Assistant Superintendent for school aid (Allan Kingston) were regarded by the legislators interviewed as "excellent" sources of information as well as having expertise in their respective areas. There were some people close to the legislature and the DPI who felt that the Deputy Superintendent would be "great" if his responsibilities were not so many. This situation was caused, in part, by the illness of the State Superintendent at which time the Deputy Superintendent functioned both as Superintendent and as Deputy. Superintendent Kahl, however, was involved in the educational matters before the legislature. But frequently his involvement was through the Deputy Superintendent. As such, the CSSO was providing leadership but was doing so unobtrusively and indirectly. Dr. Buchmiller was the trouble shooter for the DPI especially in the area of teacher strikes, hearings, and investigations. When the legislators wanted information on public education, Buchmiller was the one to whom they turned most of the time. The following comments from some of the legislators who were interviewed reflect the high esteem they had for the Deputy Superintendent:

*He is effective, persuasive, and forceful. He really does his homework well.

*You are certain of getting an honest answer from him...he is an educational leader; people look to him. The attitude (among legislators) is "Let's call Archie rather than Kahl."

*Archie gets along with nearly everyone. He does not push too hard and people respect him for that.

> *I generally contact Archie Buchmiller for (information regarding) legislation affecting the public schools. He is the most helpful and informative. He has a very good understanding of the school aid.
>
> *He's an old-timer; he knows more about school aid than anyone I know.

Only one of the legislators that was interviewed did not indicate that Archie Buchmiller was a source of useful information. All agreed that his was a multi-faceted role which demanded a lot of his time. He was seen as trouble shooter and legislative liaison who bore the brunt of the attacks on the DPI.

There were people in Wisconsin--people knowledgeable about educational and legislative matters--who thought that there were ways in which the CSSO could influence the Governor and legislature in formulating educational policies. Such people gave many suggestions such as: "advocacy and aggressiveness"; "the ability to mobilize, generate and release timely information"; "the ability to bring together coalitions"; "his political 'stand'"; "get the backing of the legislators"; "have a direct pipeline to the Governor especially through the local superintendents"; "personal relationships"; "through the educational organizations"; "working closely with the Governor and the DOA in the preparation of the budget."

From the foregoing it seems safe to say that many people who are acquainted with the legislative process in Wisconsin think that the days of the "professional educator" are over and that the State Superintendent should be more political. Sensitivity to the political realities of life as they relate to education seems crucial to having influence. Whether this means partisan politics is a decision that must be left to the individual State Superintendent. But the implications of a political involvement by the CSSO would suggest establishing effective communications with the Democrats when they are in power and with the Republicans when they are similarly

positioned while not becoming conspicuously partisan. For an officer who is elected on a non-partisan basis such a strategy may be possible.

The Legislature

In discussing the role of state legislatures, Truman Pierce begins with the following words:

> Under the doctrine of education as a state function, it has been necessary for each state to develop a system through which responsibility for and control over schools may be exercised. State constitutions accept responsibility for providing schools and allocate authority to do so largely to the legislative branch of government. The state legislature, therefore, has great power over the public schools, although it may delegate much of it to designated sources. Thus, legislation is a more potent influence on education than state constitutions.[68]

Pierce's statement that the state legislature has great power over the public schools is of considerable importance to a discussion of the governance of education. Pierce observes that much of this power over the public schools may be delegated by the legislature to bodies such as state boards of education, state departments of education, and local school boards, but one must note the word much, for many state legislatures seem to guard what power they have. In Wisconsin, there is no state board of education to which the legislature may delegate the responsibility for broad policies. The absence of such a board means that the Department of Public Instruction in Wisconsin is rather directly controlled by the legislature, and recently more and more by the DOA. The CSSO's salary, for example, is determined by the legislature and not by a state board of education.

The legislature as well as the Governor maintains control of state financial aid legislation, and as Wirt and Kirst have pointed out: "....Issues of educational finance inevitably involve judgments on educational programs and priorities, so the constitutional separation of education from general state government can never extend to many important educational issues."[69]

Politicians realize that large sums of money gives power to those who dispose of such money. The Governor and the legislature more than the DPI are the ones who dispose of such money. In the legislature, the Joint Committee on Finance in Wisconsin is the key committee in deciding the fate of how much money will be expended for educational purposes.

The Joint Finance Committee was seen by most of our respondents as the decisive one in the legislature when major bills affecting the public schools were being debated. All eight respondents representing educational interest groups cited the Joint Finance Committee as most influential, and six of these respondents added the Assembly Education Committee, while four made reference to the Senate Education Committee. The Education Committees were seen as important only in nonfiscal educational matters. Further proof of the dominance of the Joint Finance Committee is found in the response of the 16 former and present legislators (three former and 13 present) interviewed. All 16 either directly or indirectly cited this committee as being the most important. Seven of these legislators felt that the Assembly Education Committee was influential and only four saw the Senate Education Committee as having much influence.

The power of the Joint Committee on Finance is understandable in the light of the rising cost of education and the politician's awareness of the taxpayers' revolt against tax increases. Because any bill involving a fiscal note must be approved by the Joint Finance Committee, the Committee has great influence on legislation. The Governor works closely with this Committee in attempting to make clear his point of view when he introduces a bill.

The composition of the Joint Finance Committee presents an interesting picture. On the Assembly side there are nine members: seven Democrats and two Republicans. Again, the preponderance of members from one party is the result of the dominance of that party in the Assembly. The entire Committee

has eight Democrats and six Republicans. With the Democrats outnumbering the Republicans it is not difficult to understand why Governor Lucey works closely with this Committee.

If the Joint Finance Committee is so powerful, what accounts for the relative weakness of the Education Committees? It may be too simple an answer to say that as one committee assumes power one or more other committees play secondary roles. The Education Committees may be used as a sounding board for ideas, but if there is a fiscal note to a bill even the unanimous support of the Education Committees is no guarantee that such bill will get through the Joint Committee on Finance. Perhaps the best reason for the relative weakness of the Education Committees is the public outcry against the high cost of education and the different roles they play when compared to the Joint Committee on Finance. Because of the resistance of the public to the spiralling cost of education, some legislators feared that any member who served on an Education Committee would be viewed with suspicion by the voters. At the onset of the present biennium, it was extremely difficult to get members to serve as Chairman of the Senate Education Committee. Many people attempted to explain this situation by saying that education has become "too hot and controversial an issue." One legislator commented that "education has become so unpopular in the Senate that...they couldn't find anyone who wanted to be chairman (of the Education Committee)."

Why were the legislators reluctant to hold such a position? Six of the most recent seven chairmen of the Assembly Education Committee and four of the five most recent of the Senate Education Committee lost their bids for re-election. As one observer remarked: "It is like the kiss of death." To solve the problem of finding a chairman, the Senators decided to combine education with health and welfare, so that at present there is a Health, Education, and Welfare Committee in the Senate.

Cognizant of the power of the Joint Committee on Finance, the Chairman of the Assembly Education Committee took the unprecedented step of initiating a hearing on the educational aspect of the budget. Such a move was seen as significant by some political observers in the state, but what effect it will have on the total legislative process and more particularly on the powerful Joint Committee on Finance is an unknown factor. It may prove to be merely cosmetic.

It has been pointed out that the legislature as a whole was suspicious of the DPI bureaucracy especially with the addition of federal programs and the power and administrative authority which accompanied them. However, there was a close relationship between both Education Committees and the DPI. To a lesser extent, there was a working relationship between the DPI and the Joint Committee on Finance. But all committees (especially the Assembly Education) relied heavily on the information capability of the DPI and the coordinating efforts of the designated representative of the DPI. All respondents in the legislature gave the information resources of the DPI an excellent rating. (See Table 12.)

TABLE 12

LEGISLATOR PERCEPTIONS OF THE ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDING THE MOST USEFUL INFORMATION ABOUT PUBLIC SCHOOLS TO LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES

Organizations	Frequency Mentioned	Rank
DPI	9	1
Legislative Council	3	2
Legislative Fiscal Bureau	2	3.5
Wisconsin Association of School District Administrators (WASDA)	2	3.5
WEA	1	5.5
WASB	1	5.5
DOA	0	7

Most legislators interviewed felt that DPI information was objective. Indeed, a few expressed the opinion that the information was "too objective." The Assembly Education Committee members who were interviewed were especially profuse in their praise of the information supplied by the DPI, but some observers felt that the Assembly Education Committee advances and reflects the viewpoints of the DPI.

If the DPI is given such an excellent rating by the Joint Committee on Finance and the Education Committees, why does it have such limited influence with the legislature as a whole? In part, the answer lies in the fact that the DPI has always emphasized more state aid to the schools and has always been pro equalization even before the Serrano case. It has also emphasized school consolidation (reorganization). Interest group respondents agreed that the DPI had emphasized school finance and school reorganization more than other matters. According to some observers it is mainly because of these two areas, and particularly school reorganization, that the DPI has had difficulty with the legislature. Apparently the deep seated tradition of localism causes persons from small local districts to resent consolidation. These districts then get their spokesmen to protest to their legislators who then apply the pressure to the DPI. It is reported that one legislator castigated the DPI during an election campaign by saying that "the DPI is about 10 years ahead of the times." One DPI source said that the tenuous legislature/DPI relationship existed because the legislators resent the agencies (which the legislators think are their enemies) rather than seeing them as agents of the legislature carrying out their policies.

Our attention will now be focused on the relationship between the legislature and the Governor. Since much of the Governor's function will be discussed later, no detailed discussion will be presented here. There were some legislators who described the legislature as being "weak," "hapless,"

and "devoid of any initiative." Such legislators perceived a reactive role on the part of the legislature and they may well be correct, especially on educational matters. The executive branch was regarded by most interviewees as the initiator of educational change while the legislature responded. Still, there were occasions when the legislature initiated legislation affecting education. An example of this was public financial aid to private schools. The Governor had never supported this position and the legislature has never been successful in getting this proposal through. The Governor, however, was always in touch with the legislators on the proposal. Someone from Governor's Office communicated with the Democratic Party caucus while the Governor himself talked directly to individual Republican legislators so as to get them to support his proposals.

In order to examine what appeared to be basic conflicts in the legislature, we asked legislators how important each of a selected number of conflicts was when a major school finance bill was being considered by the legislature. Our findings show that the six most important types of conflicts in rank order were:

Between political parties	1st
Between spokesmen for wealthy school districts and poor school districts	2nd
Between spokesmen for the cities and those for suburbs or rural areas	3rd
Between the Governor's supporters and the Governor's opponents	4th
Between "liberals" and "conservatives"	5th
Between business spokesmen and labor spokesmen	6th

Of course, there was overlap among the types of conflicts. Conflict between the political parties could well be seen as similar to conflict between Governor's opponents and supporters since the Governor's supporters are more likely to be of the same party as the Governor, and his opponents members of the opposing party. Yet this was not always the case since "party cohesiveness" was not as strong as might be expected. There were many

legislators who were independent in their thinking and did not vote along party lines. For example, if members had voted on strict party lines, the Governor would not have been able to get his bills through the Republican-dominated Senate.

Neither are the designations, liberals and conservatives, clean categories. Although most political and educational observers to whom we spoke felt that the Democrats were more liberal in their views on education, Democrats did not have a monopoly on liberalism. There were Republicans who were liberal and there were occasions when liberal Republicans and Democrats voted together and conservative Democrats and Republicans voted together. Many of our respondents reported that one of the biggest obstacles to the passage of any public school legislation of any appreciable sum is the conservative element in the Republican party. This would suggest that a large number of the Republican legislators were conservative. The question of liberal versus conservative may also be seen in conjunction with urban versus rural and suburban areas. It seems to be a universal phenomenon that urban areas tend to be politically more liberal while rural and suburban regions tend to be politically more conservative.

The conflict that was ranked second in importance was that between legislators from wealthy school districts and those from poor school districts. Six legislators also viewed the conflict between the political parties as being of great importance, and eight saw the wealthy versus poor districts as being of great importance. However, whereas seven legislators saw the conflict between the political parties as of moderate importance, only four saw the conflict of wealthy versus poor as of moderate importance. This wealthy versus poor conflict was crucial to the power equalization concept proposed by the Governor in his budget message for the 1973-75 biennium.

There were some Democrats from wealthy districts who were not particularly supportive of this concept which in effect requires the rich districts to return money to the state to help the poorer districts.

Despite all the conflicts it must be borne in mind that a legislator usually votes on the basis of self-interest. He votes for or against a bill depending on whether or not his district will profit by it and what the district gets determines to a large extent whether or not the legislator is re-elected. The "ordeal" of having to face the electorate seems to be a most important constraint on the policy decisions of elected officials such as legislators. It may not be too harsh to suggest that the desire of a politician (an elected official) to be elected or re-elected is the chief motivation for political decisions.

We will next turn to the Governor as a policy maker.

The Governor

When we discussed the formal powers of the Governor, we did so with the aid of Schlesinger's four criteria of tenure potential, appointive power, budgetary control, and power to veto bills. Such criteria were used as a measure of the Governor's strength. The Governor of Wisconsin was seen as strong in control over the budget and tenure potential (he can succeed himself), medium in veto powers, and somewhat weak in appointive powers.

Apparently, the citizens of Wisconsin have enjoyed participating in the election of their constitutional and statutory officers, and they have not given the Governor a very strong hand in appointing officers. Governor Lucey has attempted to make more Cabinet posts appointive rather than elective, an effort that has met with strong opposition, mainly from members of the Republican Party including former Governor Knowles.

Fully aware of such limitations the present Governor capitalized on his

budgetary control and used this to great advantage. Despite any limitations of his office, Patrick Lucey cannot be considered a weak Governor. He is the first Governor in Wisconsin to have begun a four year term of office. He has been variously described by both admirers and foes as "shrewd," "smart," "capable," "strong," "skillful," and a "real political animal." In recent years the Executive Budget in Wisconsin has become a comprehensive program budget and the Governor, being politically astute, has included many of his proposals in the Budget Bill in which there may be a number of "favorable" and a few "unfavorable" items. (All legislators will not be satisfied.) If the unfavorable items were to be taken separately they would be defeated. Consequently they were included in the omnibus bill. While a legislator may strongly object to certain proposals in the Budget Bill, there may be so many things in it which are to his advantage that he is likely to vote "yea" for it, with the hope of explaining to his constituents that he was against those unfavorable aspects of the bill but had no alternative but to vote as he did.

The use of a program budget has become a very useful tool for governors when they deal with the legislature. This tactic has been expressed in a negative sense by one Republican legislator who said that Governor Lucey used "political blackmail" to get Republican legislators to vote for his programs. Another expressed the thought that even if the Democratic-dominated Assembly approves the Governor's proposals they have to be sent to the Republican-controlled Senate where some compromises have to be made. This was particularly true for the 1973-1975 Budget Bill which emphasized property tax reform and power equalization. Under the school aid reform proposal in the state budget, some school districts would not only lose aid, but would be required to levy property taxes and pay them to the state for the support

of poorer districts. This "power equalizing" provision would apply to any school district that has an equalized property valuation per student higher than the guaranteed valuation that the state establishes as a guideline for aid. Because the Governor's estimates suggested that a number of wealthy districts would pay a total of $7 million to the state in 1973-74 and a total of $16 million in 1974-75 under the power equalization formula, there was a vigorous battle between legislators from the wealthy districts and those of the poorer districts.

Not only was the "power equalization" provision challenged in the Senate, but the Republican senators were very reluctant to give the public the impression that property tax relief was the Governor's (Democratic party's) brainchild. As election drew near, these Senators definitely wanted to get some of the credit for this popular decision. This was where much compromise between the Republicans and the Governor's forces took place.

The property tax relief idea, however, cannot be discussed adequately without reference to the Governor's task force on Educational Financing and Property Tax Reform. Over the years Wisconsin has used the task force as a means of getting citizens actively involved in governmental affairs of the state. The task force is a strong tradition in the state--a tradition based on a Populist ideology which goes back to the LaFollette years.

While tradition supports the use of task forces in Wisconsin, during Governor Lucey's administration the use of this mechanism proliferated. Why did the Governor make such extensive use of this tool? The task force was seen as having public appeal. Wisconsin people were thought to want to be involved. Having a cross section of the population represented, the task force gave credence to varied intellectual input. As one observer puts it, "It is very creditable to the legislature," since both political parties form

a part of its composition. Perhaps more important, the Governor seemed to be skeptical of the bureaucracy in the agencies and as a result he sought to get some of his proposals by popular means rather than from the agencies.

The last reason may well explain the type of relationship which existed between the DPI and the Governor. The majority of persons who were interviewed in the legislature and the interest groups did not see the State Superintendent of Public Instruction as an important source of advice to the Governor. Of eight interest group interviewees five responded that the Superintendent was a "minor source" of advice, while only three replied that he was "among the most important sources." Any politician knows the importance of votes and since the agencies in themselves did not represent the power of votes necessary for election to office it can be understood why the Governor did not especially court the agencies.

One aspect of the Governor's "political savvy" which must not be overlooked was the "aggressiveness" of his staff. As a tribute to the Governor, one respondent expresed the opinion that "the present Governor has, probably, the most aggressive and well informed staff that any Governor in the history of Wisconsin politics had." Being well informed and alert, the Governor was probably cognizant of the vote potential of the labor unions and other such bodies. And it is around this vote potential that the WEA/Governor relationship must be seen. Many of our respondents spoke of the harmonious relationship between WEA and the Governor. These respondents reported that the WEA was even instrumental in initiating the "power equalization" provision. These reports confirmed the position taken by WEA itself. A source within the association stated, "We had a lot of input into the form of the state aid formula, and the new formula ('power equalization') had roots in WEA."

WEA sources and some members of the Task Force on Educational Financing

and Property Tax Reform pointed to how visible and vocal the WEA was at the public hearings of the Task Force. One WEA source expressed the association's concerns in this way: "We changed the direction of the Task Force about 180°. We went to every meeting they had and by public condemnation, we forced them to deal with changes such as equalization of educational opportunity...which would have gone by...were it not for WEA." Not only did the WEA make itself heard by the Task Force, it communicated its concerns directly to the Governor's office, according to persons in the WEA as well as persons within the DPI.

In contrast to the WEA, the Wisconsin Association of School Boards did not enjoy what may be regarded as a strong working relationship with the Governor. A WASB source commented that "(The School Board's) relationship is not as good with this Governor as it was with the former Governor Knowles." Since Governor Lucey has taken office, personal contacts between him and the Executive Secretary of the WASB have been "infrequent." When such contacts were made "a discussion of general policy" took place. More frequently, however, the WASB sought to work with the Governor through the Secretary of the Department of Administration and the caucus staffs of Democrats in the Assembly.

In terms of the Governor's position on school finance issues the WASB was in agreement as well as disagreement. There was agreement on increased aid to the schools but much disagreement on the distribution formula of the aid. The School Board's association felt that the Governor "should let the local schools decide how they are going to deliver the education to the boys and girls." One area of conflict between the WASB and the Governor was that of "power equalization." The WASB felt that it was "too drastic at this moment" and that such a proposal was being sought without a U.S. Supreme

Court decision on school financing. Another point of disagreement was that of school reorganization which was encouraged by both the Governor and the Superintendent of Public Instruction. The School Boards opposed reorganization. The feeling was that the Boards should "concentrate on the outcomes of education rather than on the organizational structures." Such reaction by the WASB tended to support the opinion of some educators in the state that WASB was growing more and more conservative.

How was the Governor seen in terms of emphasizing his views on education in his legislative programs? Those persons to whom a form of this question was addressed overwhelmingly felt that the Governor had emphasized some programs in education. The most outstanding aspect of this emphasis, according to these respondents, was school finance, including property tax reform.

The Governor's decision-making in the domain of school finance was heavily influenced by Joe Nusbaum of the DOA, Edward Weigner, the state revenue secretary, and James Wood, Executive Assistant to the Governor. The first two men were the ones who frequently appeared before the legislature's Joint Committee on Finance. It was felt by people affiliated with the Governor that Nusbaum and Weigner looked at the financial aspects of any proposal while Jim Wood considered the political implications.

Although the Governor relied upon these three men for much of his information about school finance, he and his staff worked closely with some of the educational organizations, notably the WEA and the Wisconsin Association of School District Administrators. As we have seen before, there was no clear evidence of a close working relationship between the Governor and the DPI nor the Wisconsin Association of School Boards. However, the Wisconsin Association of School District Administrators (WASDA) enjoys a cordial relationship with the current Governor and one may speculate that the WASB will try to influence the Governor through the WASDA.

SECTION V

PROJECTIONS

We have seen that the old educational interest group coalition of the DPI, WEA, the WASB, and the Milwaukee Public School Association was broken up after years of cordial relationships. We also find that it was the consensus of our respondents that the influence of the WASB seemed to be waning and that the WEA appeared to be taking over the leadership role as the spokesman for education in the state. The WEA has aligned itself with the Governor and the legislature (principally the Assembly which is controlled by the Democrats). At the same time the WASB has established closer ties with the WASDA and no doubt will share common interests with the DPI.

The Governor/Superintendent (Kahl) relationship was more formal than informal. Moreover, the Governor was suspicious of the bureaucracies in state government, hence the DPI was not called upon to play an active role in the formulation of educational policies. The DPI was weakened by the Department of Administration and was also viewed with suspicion by the legislature, especially by the opposition party. Nonetheless, the legislators who were interviewed gave the DPI an excellent rating for its ability to provide factual information needed for education decision making. These legislators overwhelmingly stated that the most useful source of information to them, as they considered policy for the public schools, was the DPI. The Superintendent of Public Instruction was seen as a professional educator, one who maintained a low profile and was not conflict oriented, a person who pursued a non-partisan approach with the Governor and legislature, but one who did not exert aggressive leadership. It was often the Deputy State Superintendent who took the DPI's case to the legislature. He was seen as an articulate spokesman, a skillful negotiator with the legislature, and

an effective mediator in teacher strikes and other crises.

The Governor was regarded by many as strong, shrewd, and aggressive. He utilized the resources of people near him as well as those of the general public through his task forces. As a policy maker, the Governor depended to a great degree on pooled opinions in assessing educational policy needs, but he did not make these opinions his only source of information. He drew heavily upon the Department of Administration and some of the interest groups, recognizing that some degree of acceptability was required if policy making was to be effective.

Such were the salient features of our findings. We shall now turn our attention to projections and speculations. What changes in relationships are on the horizon? What will these changes mean for education?

With a new power equalization finance program passed by the legislature, to be fully implemented by 1976, the Governor and WEA have achieved a victory; moreover, this victory has placed the Democrats in a strong position, particularly the large increase in appropriations to cover higher guaranteed valuations. There has also been a huge federal revenue sharing bonanza as well as higher than anticipated state revenues so that the Governor and the legislators were able to be generous to the schools, the business community, and other interest groups, all of which may help in the 1974 election. If one assumes that Watergate will have some negative impact on the Republicans, and given the strength of Lucey as a politician, it is quite likely that Lucey will be re-elected and the legislature will be controlled by the Democrats. This, of course, would be political history for the Democrats in Wisconsin.

If such should be the case, the WEA relationships with the Governor and the legislature would be considerably strengthened and continued for

four years. Such a situation would put pressure on the WASB to do one of two things: join the Governor/WEA /legislature bandwagon or seek to effect an educational coalition without the WEA. With the formation of the Wisconsin Council of School Administrative Associations, the WASB may well resort to the latter possibility, and at the same time form a strong alliance with the Superintendent of Public Instruction who appears to have a strong leaning toward the Council (WCSAA). The WASB cannot be as political as the WEA because of the legal constraints on its member boards and their varied interests; therefore, it must get its strength through coalition with other groups. WASB may also decide to increase its limited staff to include a full-time lobbyist.

Now that there is a new Superintendent of Public Instruction who is reported by both legislators and educators to be a conservative Republican or one sympathetic to the Republicans. She will have to be extremely skillful to establish a working relationship with the Governor, especially if he wins another term of office in 1974. The Superintendent, because of her anti-WEA pronouncements during the 1973 election campaign, cannot expect to establish an amicable relationship with the WEA. Even without her anti-WEA posture her purportedly conservative philosophy seems to clash head-on with the liberal philosophy of the present WEA leadership, thereby making it difficult for the two to work harmoniously. It could be that in the future the DPI will be even further relegated to a role of lesser influence in the shaping of educational policies. With the removal of all academic qualifications for the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and the resulting politicizing of the campaign, it would not be a surprise to see a move to reconstitute a state board of education.

Such a board would most likely be appointed by the Governor with legislativ

confirmation. If the members of the board were not appointed by the Governor, the other alternative would be to have them elected on a regional basis. In this case, however, the Governor might move to make the office of the State Superintendent appointive rather than elective. This would necessitate a constitutional change since the State Superintendent is a constitutional officer. If a state board of education becomes a reality it is almost certain that the Governor will move to have either the board or the Superintendent appointive. The implication of all this is a move to have the Governor exercise more control over the DPI. If the Superintendent were elected, the appointed board would presumably be able to constrain him or her. On the other hand, if the Superintendent were appointed by the Governor, the elected board would have little power over the Superintendent since he or she would not serve at the pleasure of the board.

A further look into the future shows that if Governor Lucey is re-elected to serve four more years in office, it is unlikely that he will continue the extensive use of task forces to help solve some of his problems. For one thing, the task forces are costly. Secondly, many knowledgeable people within the legislature and in educational circles think that the citizens are tired of them. Some people are now beginning to question the efficacy of this strategy. They tend to view such task forces as political gimmicks playing overtures to the unwary public. Such people contend that there is evidence to suggest that the final recommendations of the task forces were predetermined by the Governor and his allies and that the Governor's allies on the task forces merely sell their ideas to the majority of the members.

In conclusion, the immediate future seems bright for Governor Lucey and the Democrats in Wisconsin. An alliance comprising the Governor, a Democratic-dominated legislature, and the WEA augurs well for the support of

public education. Perhaps there will develop a countervailing force in a new alliance. Such an alliance is most likely to come from a coalition of the educational interest groups (except for the WEA). Future developments in the governance of education in Wisconsin will continue to warrant scrutiny.

FOOTNOTES

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[3]Rankings of the States, Research Division, National Education Association, Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 8.

[4]The State of Wisconsin Blue Book, 1971, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, 1971, pp. 206-207.

[5]James R. Donoghue, op. cit., p. 4.

[6]Larry Gara, op. cit., pp. 89-94.

[7]The State of Wisconsin Blue Book, 1971, p. 207.

[8]James R. Donoghue, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

[9]Rankings of the States, p. 10.

[10]The State of Wisconsin Blue Book, 1971, p. 206.

[11]Jon G. Udell, Wisconsin's Economic Progress, Bureau of Business Research and Service, University of Wisconsin, Madison, January 1971, p. 1.

[12]Unless footnoted, the statistics in this section were derived from Rankings of the States, and 1970 Census of Population, United States Summary.

[13]Jon G. Udell, William A. Strang, and Gene A. Gohlke, Wisconsin's Economy in 1975, Bureau of Business Research and Service, University of Wisconsin, Madison, December 1967, pp. 4-5.

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[17]Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism, 2d Edition, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York, 1972, p. 100.

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[19] Larry Gara, op. cit., pp. 250-251.

[20] Edward G. Ryan in Ibid., p. 194.

[21] Ibid., p. 197.

[22] Ibid., pp. 221-225.

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[25] Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa, and Douglas Matthews, The Almanac of American Politics, Gambit Incorporated, Boston, 1972, p. 884.

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[27] James R. Donoghue, op. cit., p. 64.

[28] The State of Wisconsin Blue Book, 1971, pp. 133-147.

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[30] The Book of the States, Council of State Governments, Lexington, Kentucky, 1972.

[31] State of Wisconsin Blue Book, 1971, p. 112.

[32] John A. Grumm, "The Effects of Legislative Structure on Legislative Performance," in State and Urban Politics, Edited by Richard I. Hofferbert and Ira Sharkansky, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1971, pp. 298-322.

[33] Ibid., p. 317.

[34] John Burns, The Sometime Governments, Bantam Books, New York, 1971, pp. 52-53.

[35] State of Wisconsin Blue Book, 1971, pp. 113-125.

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[37] James R. Donoghue, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

[38] Section 121.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes, as reported in General State Aid to Local School Districts for 1973-1975, Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, Madison, December 15, 1972, p. 6.

[39] Ibid., p. 3.

[40] Ibid., p. 8.

[41] Distribution of Wisconsin Public School State Aid Dollars, 1971-1972, Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, Madison, undated, pp. II, III.

[42] The Governor's Task Force on Educational Financing and Property Tax Reform, draft of Final Report, February 1973, p. 20.

[43] Ibid., p. 18.

[44] Ibid., p. 21.

[45] Ibid., p. 22.

[46] Information gained from interviews with officials in the Department of Public Instruction, Madison, November 1972.

[47] Interviews with staff members, Legislative Fiscal Bureau and Legislative Council, Madison, March 1973.

[48] The Governor's Task Force on Educational Financing and Property Tax Reform, p. 13.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid., p. 1.

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[52] Rankings of the States, 1973, National Education Association, Washington, 1973, pp. 49-51.

[53] The Governor's Task Force on Educational Financing and Property Tax Reform, p. 9.

[54] Ibid., p. 5.

[55] Ibid., p. 36.

[56] Information gathered from the Department of Public Instruction.

[57] See "Position Paper on Equal Educational Opportunity," Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, 1972.

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[62] See "Administrative Code Requirement in Human Relations," Department of Public Instruction, Madison, 1972.

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APPENDIX

STATE OF WISCONSIN
THE EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE PROJECT FIELD RESEARCH
November 1972, February and March 1973

Organizational Affiliation	Number of Formal Interviews	Number of Informal Interviews
Interest Group Representatives	7	3
Department of Public Instruction Personnel	2	6
Members of the Executive Staff	3	2
Legislators and Legislative Staff	18	0
Academicians	0	2
Newspaper Correspondent	0	1
Governor's Task Force Members and Citizens	0	3
TOTAL	30	17